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A larger proportion of the United States population is aging, and the
graying of America will continue as the "baby-boom" generation ages.'
Presently, over thirty-one million Americans, 12.4% of the United States
population, are age sixty-five or older.2 By the year 2020, this age group
will represent approximately twenty percent of the United States popula-
tion.3 Retirees and employees approaching retirement rely on their pen-
1. Demographic Changes in the United States: The Economic and Social Conse-
quences into the 21st Century Before the Subcomm. on Economic Resources, Competitive-
ness, and Security Economics of the Senate Joint Economic Comm., 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 26
(1987) (statement of John G. Keane, Director, Bureau of the Census). There are two pri-
mary reasons for the explosion of the elderly population. First, the absolute number of
people who reach age 65 has increased, and the "baby boomers" will contribute to this age
bracket by 2005. Lawrence A. Frolik & Alison P. Barnes, An Aging Population: A Chal-
lenge to the Law, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 683, 688 (1991). Second, as average life expectancy
increases, many individuals will live long past age 65. Id. at 689. While the average life
expectancy in the United States in 1950 was 68.2 years, it had climbed to 74.9 years by
1985. Id.
2. Joseph F. Coates et a]., Future Work, THE FUTURIST, May-June 1991, at 11; see Jan
Ellen Rein, Preserving Dignity and Self-Determination of the Elderly in the Face of Compet-
ing Interests and Grim Alternatives: A Proposal for Statutory Refocus and Reform, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1818, 1847 (1992) (finding that, by 1990, one out of eight Americans was
age 65 or older). In comparison, individuals age 65 or older comprised only 8.1% of the
United States population in 1950. Frolik & Barnes, supra note 1, at 688 n.9.
Using age 65 to label an individual as "old" is an arbitrary demarcation. See id. at 684-
86. Those who reach this benchmark may not satisfy the stereotype of an elderly person
because they are not yet physically or mentally incapacitated. Id. To make further distinc-
tions among the elderly, they can be categorized into three distinct groups. Id. at 690.
Those age 65 to 75 comprise the "young old;" those age 75 to 85 constitute the "old;" those
age 85 and over comprise the "old old." Id. The 85 and over group is one of the fastest
growing segments of the United States population. Id. In 1980, 1.5 million women and
675,000 men were included in the "old old" category. Id. Nevertheless, the government,
employers, and other social institutions prefer to use an objective bright-line of age 65 for
administrative ease and to avoid a subjective determination of an individual's condition.
See id. at 687.
3. See Frolik & Barnes, supra note 1, at 688 n.9. By 2050, it is estimated that 21.7%
of all Americans will constitute the 65 and older age bracket. Id. at 688.
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sion benefit plans4 to ensure their current and future financial security. 5
Private pension fund assets are the largest source of capital in the United
States, totaling $2.26 trillion in 1990.6 This substantial capital source has
tempted those entrusted with pension fund administration and manage-
ment to abuse and misuse these resources for their own private pur-
poses.7 Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security
4. Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) an "employee
pension benefit plan" is
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the
extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such
plan, fund, or program-
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the
termination of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the method of calcu-
lating the contributions made to the plan, the method of calculating the benefits
under the plan or the method of distributing benefits from the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1988). ERISA also covers employee welfare benefit plans, which
are defined as
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the
extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the
purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or ben-
efits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemploy-
ment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care
centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit described
in section 186(c) of this title (other than pensions on retirement or death, and
insurance to provide such pensions).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988). An ERISA "employee benefit plan" refers to "an employee
welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an em-
ployee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan." Id. § 1002(3).
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988) (stating "that the continued well-being and security
of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by these [employee
benefit] plans"). The need to provide financial security for current and potential retirees is
growing because of
(1) the growth in the number and proportion of the aged population of the
United States; (2) the decrease in employment opportunities for the aged; (3) the
decreased capacity of the general public to save for old age as a result of in-
creased taxes and inflation; and (4) a general erosion in society's concern with
filial responsibility.
Bradley R. Duncan, Note, Judicial Review of Fiduciary Claim Denials Under ERISA: An
Alternative to the Arbitrary and Capricious Test, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 986, 1006 n.99 (1986).
6. Joel Chernoff, U.S. Pension Assets Reach $4.44 Trillion, PENSIONS AND INVEST-
MENTS, Jan. 25, 1993, at 1. Pension funds currently hold 25% of the equity in United States
corporations, but this will increase to 40% by the year 2000. Jayne E. Zanglein, Pensions,
Proxies and Power: Recent Developments in the Use of Proxy Voting to Influence Corporate
Governance, 7 LAB. LAw. 771, 771 (1991).
7. Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that pension funds
are susceptible to being "pilfered, embezzled, parlayed, mismanaged and outright stolen by
unscrupulous persons occupying positions of trust and confidence"). The drafters of ER-
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Act' (ERISA) to safeguard the soundness and stability of employee ben-
efit plans, assuring American employees that they would receive their re-
tirement benefits. 9
Title I of ERISA' ° protects individual pension rights by mandating that
every plan designate at least one "named fiduciary" to manage the plan's
ISA recognized the problems of pension fund abuse. For example, Senator Ribicoff noted
that
[w]hile most corporate pension funds are carefully managed and conservatively
invested, misuse, manipulation, and poor management of pension trust funds are
all too frequent. One financially ailing company tried to borrow over a million
dollars from a subsidiary's pension pool for use as operating capital. Another
company has a policy of investing more than half its pension fund's assets in the
company's own common stock and in the real estate of a company subsidiary.
And yet another firm routinely dips into its pension funds for cash to make
acquisitions.
119 CONo. REC. 147 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1973) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff).
Senator Ribicoff also discussed the abuses of George Barasch, a pension fund fiduciary
who fully controlled two union employee benefit plans, which held a total of $15.5 million.
120 CONG. REC. 29,951 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (statement of Sen. Bentsen). Barasch
improperly used these funds to capitalize several corporations and to create a management
firm to administer the pension funds. Id. He also channeled the funds into various foreign
corporations, some of which he had created. Id. In total, Barasch diverted almost five
million dollars from the employees' pension plan assets. Id. Moreover, Barasch received
an annual salary of $35,000, life insurance coverage in the amount of $407,000, and total
retirement benefits in the amount of $54,098 per year. Id. His pension fund alone was
worth $796,925. Id. Barasch returned $4.2 million to the employee benefit plans only after
being pressured by a Senate subcommittee and federal and state agencies. Id. Incredibly,
federal and state officials never prosecuted Barasch because he had not broken any laws.
Id.
8. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1500 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
9. The House Education and Labor Committee stated that ERISA's purpose was "to
assure American workers that they may look forward, with anticipation, to a retirement
with financial security and dignity, and without fear that this period of life will be lacking in
the necessities to sustain them as human beings within our society." H.R. REP. No. 533,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4646. The Committee
added that Congress also enacted ERISA to stabilize the private pension plan system,
which plays a major role in the United States economy. Id. at 4646-47; see Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983) (stating that the purpose of ERISA is "to promote
the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans"); Nachman
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 374 (1980) (stating that "[o]ne of Con-
gress' central purposes in enacting this complex legislation was to prevent the 'great per-
sonal tragedy' suffered by employees whose vested benefits are not paid when pension
plans are terminated" (footnote omitted)).
10. ERISA is divided into four titles. Title I provides for the protection of employee
benefit rights by outlining reporting and disclosure requirements, participation and vesting
requirements, funding standards, fiduciary responsibilities, administration and enforce-
ment procedures, and continued health coverage requirements. ERISA §§ 2 to 514, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144 (1988). Title II addresses ERISA's tax consequences. ERISA, Pub.
L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832, 898 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
Title III delineates the jurisdiction of federal agencies and establishes procedures for joint
1168 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 43:1165
operation and administration. 1 ERISA broadly defines "fiduciary" as
any person who has discretionary authority or control over a plan's man-
agement or assets. 2 This functional definition typically encompasses
trustees, plan administrators with discretionary control, a plan's invest-
ment committee, investment advisors, and the persons who select these
individuals.' ERISA fiduciaries must exercise their authority in the sole
interest of the plan participants 14 and beneficiaries,' 5 and must abide by
the standard of conduct that a prudent man would exercise under similar
circumstances.' 6 Moreover, fiduciaries must carefully diversify plan as-
administration of the Act by the Secretaries of Labor and Treasury. ERISA §§ 3001-3042,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1242 (1988). Title IV establishes a plan termination insurance program
administered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. ERISA §§ 4001-4082, 29
U.S.C. § 1301-1382 (1988).
11. ERISA § 402(a)(1)-(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(1)-(2) (1988). Under the Act, a
named fiduciary may delegate her fiduciary responsibilities. ERISA § 405(c)(1)(B), 29
U.S.C. § 1105(c)(1)(B) (1988); see also Madden v. ITT Long Term Disability Plan for Sala-
ried Employees, 914 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1087 (1991).
12. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1988). The full text of the definition
is as follows:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition
of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation,
direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or
has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary au-
thority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.
Id.; see also Olson v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 957 F.2d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 1992) (defining an
ERISA fiduciary as anyone who exercises discretionary authority or control over the man-
agement and assets of a plan); American Fed'n of Unions Local 102 Health & Welfare
Fund v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 841 F.2d 658, 662 (5th Cir.
1988) (same); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yampol, 840 F.2d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 1988) (same).
13. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2509.75-8, 2510.3-21 (1993). Under ERISA, employers may be
fiduciaries to the extent that they function as plan administrators with discretionary control
over the plan. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988).
14. ERISA defines "participant" as
any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former
member of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a
benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of
such employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be
eligible to receive any such benefit.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1988).
15. ERISA defines "beneficiary" as "a person designated by a participant, or by the
terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereun-
der." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1988).
16. ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1988). The statute provides that an
ERISA
fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of
the participants and beneficiaries and-
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
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sets and comply with plan documents.' 7 If a fiduciary breaches his re-
sponsibilities, a participant or beneficiary may sue under section
502(a)(2) of ERISA 18 to hold such fiduciary personally liable for any re-
sulting loss to the plan, to mandate restoration of any profits gained
through the use of plan assets, or to subject the fiduciary to other equita-
ble and legal relief. 9
In contrast to fiduciaries who exercise discretionary control over pen-
sion plan management, nonfiduciaries perform nondiscretionary, ministe-
rial and advisory functions for a pension plan.2" Nonfiduciaries include
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and
with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of
large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so;
and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions
of this subchapter ....
Id.
17. Id.
18. ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1988). The statute provides that "[a]
civil action may be brought-(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduci-
ary for appropriate relief under section 409." Id.
19. See ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1988). The civil action may be brought
to recover the appropriate relief under ERISA § 409, which provides:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter
[Title I] shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan
resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such
fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary,
and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may
deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.
Id.; see, e.g., Starr v. JCI Data Processing, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 633, 641-42 (D.N.J. 1991)
(holding that an ERISA fiduciary breached his fiduciary duty of care by failing to ensure
that a retirement plan was in compliance with ERISA's statutory requirements); Chambers
v. Kaleidoscope, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan & Trust, 650 F. Supp. 359, 376-77 (N.D. Ga. 1986)
(holding that ERISA fiduciaries breached their fiduciary duties of care, prudence, and dili-
gence where they, among other things, failed to provide participants with a summary de-
scription of the plan, failed to file records and reports pursuant to statutory requirements,
and failed to inform participants of the effects of the sponsoring company's poor financial
condition on the plan); McNeese v. Health Plan Mktg., Inc., 647 F. Supp. 981, 986 (N.D.
Ala. 1986) (holding that an ERISA fiduciary breached his obligations by failing to provide
participants with annual financial reports that would have alerted them to the plan's de-
clining financial status); see also infra note 29 (discussing the distinctions between legal and
equitable remedies).
20. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5 (1993). A "nonfiduciary" is
an attorney, accountant, actuary or consultant who renders legal, accounting, ac-
tuarial or consulting services to an employee benefit plan (other than an invest-
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professionals who render services, such as actuaries,21 attorneys,22 ac-
countants,23 and plan administration companies.24 While nonfiduciaries
are not held to the same standard of conduct as fiduciaries,25 most United
ment adviser to the plan)... absent a showing that such consultant (a) exercises
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting the management of the
plan, (b) exercises authority or control respecting management or disposition of
the plan's assets, (c) renders investment advice for a fee, direct or indirect, with
respect to the assets of the plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or
(d) has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the adminis-
tration of the plan.
Id.
21. Pappas v. Buck Consultants, Inc., 923 F.2d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that an
actuary who provides actuarial advice to a fiduciary is not an ERISA fiduciary); Fechter v.
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 798 F. Supp. 1120, 1125 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that actu-
aries who perform typical actuarial services are not ERISA fiduciaries).
22. Anoka Orthopaedic Assoc. v. Lechner, 910 F.2d 514, 517 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding
that an attorney who provides legal advice for a plan, helps prepare the plan's financial
statements and makes two investment recommendations is not a fiduciary); Yeseta v.
Baima, 837 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that an attorney who reviews a plan's
compliance with ERISA does not maintain control over the plan and therefore is not an
ERISA fiduciary); New York State Teamsters Council Health & Hosp. Fund v. Estate of
DePerno, 816 F. Supp. 138, 148 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that a pension fund attorney who
does not provide daily direction, does not exercise discretionary authority or control over
the plan's management and assets, and does not provide investment advice is not an ER-
ISA fiduciary). But see Bouton v. Thompson, 764 F. Supp. 20, 23 (D. Conn. 1991) (finding
that an attorney who provides legal services to an employer and its president may be an
ERISA fiduciary if the attorney exercises discretionary authority or control over the plan).
23. Painters of Philadelphia Dist. Council No. 21 Welfare Fund v. Price Waterhouse,
879 F.2d 1146, 1149 (3d Cir. 1989) (deciding that an accounting firm that serves as the
auditor of a plan is not a fiduciary because it does not exercise authority over the plan
assets); Pension Plan of Pub. Serv. Co. v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 815 F. Supp. 52, 55
(D.N.H. 1993) (stating that an independent accounting firm that merely performed an au-
dit for an ERISA plan is not an ERISA fiduciary); Brown v. Roth, 729 F. Supp. 391, 396
(D.N.J. 1990) (determining that an accountant, who did not have authority to sign a trust's
checks, to pass on the validity of claims, or to implement plan policy is not an ERISA
fiduciary). But see Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 669 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that ac-
countants who, in addition to providing normal accounting services, recommend transac-
tions, structure deals, and provide investment advice are ERISA fiduciaries), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 979 (1993); Wright v. Nimmons, 641 F. Supp. 1391, 1402 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (finding
that an accountant who has authority over and responsibility for a plan is an ERISA
fiduciary).
24. Pohl v. National Benefits Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1992) (stat-
ing that a plan administrator who performs only ministerial and clerical functions is not an
ERISA fiduciary); Baxter v. C.A. Muer Corp., 941 F.2d 451, 455-56 (6th Cir. 1991) (decid-
ing that a plan administrator who merely processes and pays claims pursuant to the plan's
terms is not an ERISA fiduciary); Mitnik v. Cannon, 784 F. Supp. 1190, 1194 (E.D. Pa.
1992) (finding that neither a company nor a president of a company that prepares year-end
reports and provides accounting services are fiduciaries with respect to the plan), aff'd, 989
F.2d 488 (1993).
25. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (describing ERISA's fiduciary stan-
dard of conduct).
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States Circuit Courts impose liability on nonfiduciaries who knowingly
participate in the breach of a fiduciary's obligations.26
This liability is commonly based on the common law of trusts, which is
the foundation of ERISA.27 Trust law provides a cause of action against
nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in a breach of trust in an effort
to make the victims of the breach whole.2" These circuits provide both
legal and equitable relief in such cases.29 Both forms of relief may be
based on the broad judicial interpretation of section 502(a)(3) of ER-
ISA,3° which permits a participant or beneficiary to obtain an injunction
26. See Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that a nonfi-
duciary union representative is liable when he "aid[ed] and assist[ed]" a fiduciary in "fur-
thering his breach of fiduciary duty"); Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d
1209, 1220 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that "parties who knowingly participate in fiduciary
breaches may be liable under ERISA to the same extent as the fiduciaries"); Fink v. Na-
tional Sav. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding the nonfiduciary
founder of a holding company liable for a breach of fiduciary duty because courts "may
award relief against nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in a breach of trust"); Thorn-
ton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1082 (7th Cir. 1982) (deciding that a nonfiduciary who con-
spires with a fiduciary to mislead other fiduciaries into taking action detrimental to the
plan is liable under ERISA); Brock v. Gerace, 635 F. Supp. 563, 569 (D.N.J. 1986) (holding
nonfiduciaries who reap personal gain from their knowing participation in a fiduciary
breach liable); Donovan v. Daugherty, 550 F. Supp. 390, 410-11 (S.D. Ala. 1982) (stating
that a nonfiduciary who is enriched by his knowing participation in a trustee's fiduciary
violation is liable); Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 642 (W.D. Wis.
1979) (finding that nonfiduciaries are liable for their knowing participation in a trustee's
breach of fiduciary duty).
27. See 120 CONG. REC. 29,932 (1974) (statement of Sen. Lover).
28. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (discussing nonfiduciary liability
under the common law of trusts).
29. While many courts have addressed nonfiduciary liability issues, only a few courts
have addressed nonfiduciary remedial issues. See, e.g., Hendershott, 840 F.2d at 342 (re-
quiring a nonfiduciary to disgorge his realized financial gain and enjoining him from selling
goods to or acting as a fiduciary of an ERISA benefit plan for five years); Lowen, 829 F.2d
at 1221 (ordering a nonfiduciary to disgorge fees and other consideration received in viola-
tion of ERISA); Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 644 (permanently prohibiting nonfiduciaries from
serving as fiduciaries with respect to the pension plan, enjoining them from further ERISA
violations, and finding them jointly and severally liable to restore damages).
Although the two judicial systems of law and equity have merged, the classification of a
remedy as either legal or equitable still persists. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES
§ 2.1(1), at 48 (2d ed. 1993). "Legal" remedies are "traditionally recognized by the old
separate law courts," while "equitable" remedies are traditionally recognized by the Chan-
cellors. Id. This distinction is important for purposes of litigation because a jury trial is not
available in equity cases. Id. § 1.2, at 9. This distinction also is significant because equita-
ble relief is traditionally discretionary. Id. Traditional equitable remedies include: the in-
junction, which is a personal order forcing the defendant to act or prohibiting the
defendant from acting in a certain manner; the declaratory judgment, which "provides an
authoritative declaration of the parties' disputed rights;" and restitution, through which a
"plaintiff can recover things or money to prevent the defendant's unjust enrichment." Id.
§ 2.1(2), at 53-54.
30. See infra note 52 (providing the text of section 502(a)(3)).
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and other forms of equitable relief; section 502(l) of ERISA,3 1 which au-
thorizes the Secretary of Labor to assess a penalty on nonfiduciary indi-
viduals who knowingly participate in a fiduciary breach; and trust law
principles that utilize both remedial forms to provide complete relief for
participants and beneficiaries. 32 Furthermore, because some courts have
interpreted ERISA to preempt state remedies, they broadly construe
ERISA's remedies to include both equitable and legal relief against
nonfiduciaries.33 In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,34 however, the United
States Supreme Court rejected the circuit courts' broad remedial inter-
pretations and maintained that money damages35 are not available
against nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in the breach of a fidu-
ciary's duty.36
The petitioners in Mertens were former employees of the Kaiser Steel
Corporation (Kaiser) and participants 37 in the Kaiser Steel Retirement
Plan, an ERISA pension plan.38 In 1980, Kaiser terminated a portion of
its operations, forcing many of its employees into early retirement.39 The
petitioners alleged that Hewitt Associates (Hewitt), the actuaries for the
retirement plan, did not recalculate their actuarial assumptions to reflect
31. See infra note 44 (providing the text of section 502(1)).
32. See infra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing remedies available under the
common law of trusts).
33. See infra notes 260-62 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA preemption).
There is no clear authority determining whether ERISA precludes a state suit for profes-
sional malpractice against nonfiduciaries. Compare Gibson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 915 F.2d
414, 418 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that ERISA not only restricts actions against
nonfiduciaries, but also preempts non-ERISA actions against them) with Sparks v. Mo-
Kan Iron Workers Pension Fund, 765 F. Supp. 566, 569 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (finding that
because ERISA does not regulate claims against nonfiduciaries, ERISA does not preempt
state law claims against them).
34. 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993).
35. A money damages remedy is a traditional legal remedy. Donas, supra note 29,
§ 1.2, at 9. "The damages remedy is a judicial award in money, payable as compensation to
one who has suffered a legally recognized injury or harm." Id. § 3.1, at 208 (footnote
omitted). Traditionally, this award is made in a single "lump sum to compensate for all the
relevant injuries, past and future." Id. (footnote omitted).
36. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2072; see infra notes 166-201 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the majority opinion in Mertens).
37. See supra note 14 (defining participant under ERISA).
38. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2065; see supra note 4 (providing the definition of an ERISA
employee pension benefit plan). Employers who establish pension plans that meet ER-
ISA's qualifications receive special tax treatment. An employer may immediately deduct
its contributions to the plan. I.R.C. § 404(a)(1)-(3) (1988). Employees who participate in
the plan also receive special tax treatment. An employee-participant is not required to pay
tax on his benefits until his benefits are actually distributed. I.R.C. § 402(a)(1). An em-
ployee-participant also enjoys a tax-free interest buildup on his benefits. I.R.C. § 501(a)
(1988).
39. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2065.
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this change, causing the plan to be underfunded and unable to pay full
benefits to its participants. 4' The petitioners, seeking recovery for their
losses, sued the fiduciaries of the plan for breaching their fiduciary duties
and sued Hewitt for money damages for knowingly participating in the
fiduciary breaches.4'
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
found the petitioners' claims insufficient and dismissed them as a matter
of law.42 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed this ruling consistent with its decision in Nieto v. Ecker43 and with
its reluctance to construe additional remedies from section 502(1) of ER-
ISA.44 The Ninth Circuit also dismissed the claim for nonfiduciary resti-
tution45 because the petitioners did not establish a direct link between the
40. Id. (explaining that the petitioners received an amount that was "substantially
lower" than the fully vested benefits to which they were entitled).
41. Id.
42. Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 948 F.2d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2063
(1993). The district court granted Hewitt's motion to dismiss the complaint, which alleged
a "breach of professional duties to the plan" under ERISA, because the complaint failed to
state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. at 609.
43. 845 F.2d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1988) (determining that no cause of action exists against
a nonfiduciary alleged to have knowingly participated in a trustee's breach of fiduciary
duty by failing to supervise the trustee); see infra notes 121-42 and accompanying text
(providing a full discussion of Nieto).
44. Mertens, 948 F.2d at 611 (examining only the "plain language" of section 502(l)
because " '[wihere a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court
must be chary of reading others into it'" (quoting Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985))). Section 502(/) of ERISA provides in relevant part:
(1) In the case of-
(A) any breach of fiduciary responsibility under (or other violation of)
part 4 of this subtitle by a fiduciary, or
(B) any knowing participation in such a breach or violation by any other
person, the Secretary shall assess a civil penalty against such fiduciary or
other person in an amount equal to 20 percent of the applicable recovery
amount.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "applicable recovery amount"
means any amount which is recovered from a fiduciary or other person with re-
spect to a breach or violation described in paragraph (1)-
(A) pursuant to any settlement agreement with the Secretary, or
(B) ordered by a court to be paid by such fiduciary or other person to a
plan or its participants and beneficiaries in a judicial proceeding instituted by
the Secretary under subsection (a)(2) or (a)(5) of this section.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(l) (Supp. III 1991).
45. Mertens, 948 F.2d at 612. "Restitution is a return or restoration of what the de-
fendant has gained in a transaction. It may be a return of a specific thing or it may be a
'return' of a money substitute for that thing." DOBBS, supra note 29, § 4.1(1), at 365; see
also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. a, at 12 (1937) (stating that "[a] person ob-
tains restitution when he is restored to the position he formerly occupied either by the
return of something which he formerly had or by the receipt of its equivalent in money").
Restitution is a legal remedy in some cases and an equitable remedy in others. Donas,
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loss and the recovery sought.' The court found that Kaiser used its own
corporate funds, rather than the plan's assets to pay for Hewitt's actuarial
services.47 Therefore, Hewitt was not unjustly enriched.4 Further, in ac-
cordance with the Nieto decision, the Ninth Circuit ruled that allowing
the plaintiffs to recover money damages from Hewitt would be inconsis-
tent with section 502(l). 49
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in a breach of fiduciary
duty may be liable for money damages under ERISA.5 ° The majority,
led by Justice Scalia, affirmed the Ninth Circuit's holding, finding that the
petitioners was entitled to traditional equitable relief, but not money
damages." The Court reasoned that the term "equitable relief" in sec-
tion 502(a)(3) 52 referred exclusively to traditional equitable remedies,
supra note 29, § 1.2, at 9. The classification depends upon the specific type of restitution
sought. Id.; see also RESTATMENT OF RESTITUTION gen. scope note at 4 (1937) (noting that
the principles of restitution are the same at law and in equity). See generally Douglas
Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEx. L. REV. 1277 (1989) (providing
a general review of the definition and implications of restitution).
46. Mertens, 948 F.2d at 612 (explaining that "restitution requires that there be a di-
rect link between the loss complained of and the recovery sought").
47. Id.
48. Id. A person is unjustly enriched if his "retention of the benefit would be unjust."
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. a, at 12 (1937). Unjust enrichment is the "funda-
mental substantive basis for restitution." DOBBS, supra note 29, § 4.1(2), at 371. A defend-
ant may be "unjustly enriched by receiving something, tangible or intangible, that properly
belongs to the plaintiff." Id. The remedy of "[r]estitution rectifies unjust enrichment by
forcing restoration to the plaintiff." Id.; see also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937)
("A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make
restitution to the other."). Although "unjust enrichment" is not clearly defined, the con-
cept frequently arises in the following cases: (1) where the defendant benefits and title
remains in the plaintiff; (2) where the defendant benefits and title passes through miscon-
duct; (3) where the defendant benefits as a result of a breach of contract; and (4) where the
defendant receives benefits of money or services without misconduct, such as mistakes and
other disruptions in contracting. DOBBS, supra note 29, § 4.1(2), at 371-74.
49. Mertens, 948 F.2d at 611; see supra note 44 (providing the text of section 502(l)).
50. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 113 S. Ct. 2063, 2066 (1993).
51. See id. at 2071-72; see supra note 29 (explaining the distinction between legal and
equitable remedies).
52. ERISA section 502(a)(3) provides, in part:
A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary-
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to en-
force his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice
which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such viola-
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which do not include money damages.13 The dissent, written by Justice
White, maintained that section 502(a)(3) should be interpreted to provide
compensatory monetary relief to make a participant or beneficiary whole
for a breach of trust.5 4 The dissent reasoned that this interpretation cor-
responds with ERISA's primary goal of protecting plan participants and
beneficiaries through established trust remedies.5
This Note examines the principles of trust law concerning fiduciary
breaches and analyzes the relevant ERISA provisions based on those
principles. This Note then discusses the conflicting positions among the
federal circuits regarding the provision of money damages for nonfiduci-
ary liability resulting from knowing participation in a fiduciary breach
prior to Mertens. This Note analyzes the reasoning of Mertens and its
impact on the resolution of the conflicting judicial interpretations of this
issue. Furthermore, this Note asserts that the dissent in Mertens is correct
in reasoning that ERISA provides money damages to redress nonfiduci-
ary liability because this interpretation is consistent with the intent of
ERISA's drafters and the tenets of trust law. Finally, this Note concludes
that the Mertens decision will result in a level of protection for plan par-
ticipants and beneficiaries who are victims of fiduciary breaches that is
lower than that formerly available to such victims under the common law
of trusts prior to ERISA's enactment, a result that directly counters ER-
ISA's purpose.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF ERISA's REMEDIAL SCHEME FROM THE
COMMON LAW OF TRUSTS TO CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS
A. Trust Law Principles Concerning Fiduciary and
Nonfiduciary Liability
Prior to ERISA's enactment in 1974, the common law of trusts gov-
erned the imposition of liability on trustees and the remedies available to
trust beneficiaries s6 A trustee is a fiduciary who acts for the benefit of
tions or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of
the plan;...
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1), (3) (1988).
53. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2071.
54. Id. at 2078 (White, J., dissenting).
55. Id.
56. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4643. In general, "[a] trust may be defined as a property right held by one party for the use
of another." Keplinger v. Keplinger, 113 N.E. 292, 293 (Ind. 1916). Parties may elect to
form an express trust, a charitable trust, a resulting trust, or a constructive trust. An ex-
press trust is defined as "a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the
person by whom the title to the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the prop-
erty for the benefit of another person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an
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another,57 the beneficiary.58 The trustee owes a duty to the beneficiary to
manage the trust with the standard of care and skill that an ordinary pru-
dent man would exercise in dealing with his own property.59 The trustee
also is governed by a duty of loyalty, that requires him to administer a
trust solely in the interest of its beneficiaries.6 ° If a trustee breaches his
duties, the beneficiary is entitled to both legal and equitable relief.61
intention to create it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959). A charitable trust
differs from an express trust only in that the equitable duties are invoked "to deal with the
property for a charitable purpose." Id. § 348. A resulting trust is defined as an instrument
whereby
a person makes or causes to be made a disposition of property under circum-
stances which raise an inference that he does not intend that the person taking or
holding the property should have the beneficial interest therein, unless the infer-
ence is rebutted or the beneficial interest is otherwise effectively disposed of.
Id. § 404. Finally, a constructive trust
is a relationship with respect to property subjecting the person by whom the title
to the property is held to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground
that his acquisition or retention of the property is wrongful and that he would be
unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain the property.
Id. § 1 cmt. e, at 5.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959); see also GEORGE G. BOGERT &
GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1, 4-5 (1984) (defining a
"trustee" as "the individual or entity (often an artificial person such as a corporation)
which holds the trust property for the benefit of another" (footnote omitted)).
58. A beneficiary is "[t]he person for whose benefit property is held in trust." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 3(4) (1959); see also BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note
57, § 1, at 5 (defining "beneficiary" as "the person for whose benefit the trust property is
held by the trustee" (footnote omitted)).
59. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 57, § 541, at 167 (explaining that the trustee has a
duty to manage the trust with "the care, skill, prudence, and diligence of an ordinarily
prudent man engaged in similar business affairs and with objectives similar to those of the
trust in question" (footnote omitted)).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959); see also BOGERT & BOGERT,
supra note 57, § 543, at 217 (stating that a trustee must demonstrate "complete loyalty to
the interests of the beneficiary and must exclude all selfish interest and all consideration of
the interests of third persons"); see, e.g., Britton v. Winger, 442 N.E.2d 264, 266 (I11. App.
Ct. 1982) (holding that a trustee breached his duty of loyalty when he mortgaged the trust
corpus without fully disclosing the material facts to the beneficiaries); Wheeler v. Mann,
763 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1988) (finding that a trustee breached his duty of loyalty when he
invested trust funds into his own companies and used the funds to finance failing corporate
ventures).
61. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 57, § 870; see also Ex parte Morton, 75 So. 2d 500,
511 (Ala. 1954) (noting that a beneficiary "'may freely elect between the relief which the
law can give and the constructive trust device,' [an equitable remedy]" (quoting 3 Bo-
GERT'S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 471, at 11 (1993))); Lane County Escrow Serv., Inc. v.
Smith, 560 P.2d 608, 612 (Or. 1977) (acknowledging that a plaintiff may choose to pursue
either equitable or legal relief against the trustee), superseded by statute as stated in
Schmidling v. Dove, 670 P.2d 166 (Or. 1983); American Express Travel Related Serv. Co.
v. Laughlin, 623 A.2d 854, 856 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (recognizing that a "beneficiary has an
option to pursue either equitable or legal relief in an action against a trustee"), appeal
denied, 633 A.2d 149 (Pa. 1993).
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A beneficiary also has the right to expect that a third person will not
knowingly aid a breach of a trustee's duties.62 A cause of action against a
nonfiduciary for participation in a breach of trust is available to a benefi-
ciary if two elements are satisfied.63 First, the nonfiduciary's action or
omission must continue or complete the trustee's breach.6 Second, the
nonfiduciary must have known or should have known at the time he com-
mitted the action or omission that the action or omission constituted a
breach of trust.65 Where a nonfiduciary knowingly participates in a fidu-
ciary's breach of duty, the common law of trusts firmly establishes that
the nonfiduciary may be held liable for money damages.
66
The difference between legal and equitable relief is important in the context of litigation
because only those seeking legal relief are entitled to a jury trial. See Jefferson Nat'l Bank
v. Central Nat'l Bank, 700 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that an action for the
payment of indebtedness arising from a trustee's breach is an action at law properly tried
before a jury); In re Estate of Archambault, 520 A.2d 154, 154 (Vt. 1986) (stating that
because the parties sought equitable relief in the form of an accounting remedy, they did
not have a right to a jury trial); see supra note 29 (explaining the distinction between legal
and equitable remedies).
62. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 57, §§ 861, 868, at 2, 79.
63. Id. § 901, at 258-59. The two elements necessary to sustain a cause of action
against a nonfiduciary include "(1) an act or omission which furthers or completes the
breach of trust by the trustee; and (2) knowledge at the time that the transaction amounted
to a breach of trust, or the legal equivalent of such knowledge." Id. (footnotes omitted).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 901, at 259; see also Coster v. Crookham, 468 N.W.2d 802, 809 (Iowa 1991)
(stating that notice of the breach is an essential element in an action against a third person
for participation in a trustee's breach of fiduciary duty); Dahlborg v. Middleborough Trust
Co., 452 N.E.2d 281, 283 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (noting that when a trustee satisfies his
personal debts to a third person with trust funds and the third person is cognizant of the
source of funds, the third person participates in the trustee's breach).
66. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 57, § 868, at 79-80 (stating that "a third party who
has assisted a trustee in committing a breach of trust has been held liable in a suit by the
beneficiary or his representative for money damages" (footnotes omitted)); Austin W.
Scott, Participation in a Breach of Trust, 34 HARV. L. REV. 454, 454 (1920) (explaining that
"[a]nyone who participates with a trustee in a breach of trust may be held liable in a court
of equity [for damages]. . . if he has never received or no longer holds the trust property or
its proceeds"); see also Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 589 (1921) (emphasizing that when a
fiduciary breaches his duty, "others who knowingly join [him] in such an enterprise like-
wise become jointly and severally liable with him for such profits"); Ellerd v. Griffith, 22
F.2d 793, 793 (5th Cir. 1927) (stating that any defendant "who participated in the commis-
sion of [the breach of fiduciary duty] was liable to the plaintiff for damages resulting to him
therefrom"); Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 803 (N.D. Ohio
1965) (holding a third party who induced a fiduciary to reveal confidential information
liable for damages); Ripperger v. Schroder-Rockefeller & Co., 37 F. Supp. 375, 377
(S.D.N.Y. 1940) (stating that " '[o]ne who knowingly joins a fiduciary in an enterprise
where the personal interest of the latter is or may be antagonistic to his trust becomes
jointly and severally liable with him for the profits of the enterprise' " (quoting Ripperger
v. Allyn, 25 F. Supp. 554, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1938))); Saks v. Damon Raike & Co., 8 Cal. Rptr.
2d 869, 875 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (acknowledging that a beneficiary may sue the trustee and
"third persons who directly participated with the trustee in breaches of trust" for dam-
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Congress intended the common law of trusts to serve as a foundation
for ERISA and encouraged the judiciary to use trust law as a guide in
developing federal common law for ERISA.67 In Donovan v. Mazzola,68
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit employed trust
law principles to fashion an ERISA remedy for fiduciary breaches. 69 In
Mazzola, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California ordered the defendants, who had breached their fiduciary du-
ties, to post a one million dollar bond to insure the pension fund against
potential losses.7" The Ninth Circuit reviewed the order to determine
whether it was an appropriate remedy under ERISA.7' The Ninth Cicuit
ages); Rosen v. Rosen, 432 N.Y.S.2d 921, 923 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (stating that "[o]ne
who knowingly engages with a fiduciary in a breach of trust, is liable to the cestui que trust
[or beneficiary] for damages that result"); Slay v. Mary Couts Burnett Rust, 180 S.W.2d
480, 494 (Tx. Civ. App. 1944) (stating that" 'where a third party knowingly participates in
the breach of duty of a fiduciary, such third party becomes a joint tort-feasor with the
fiduciary and is liable as such' "(quoting Kinzbach Tool Co., Inc. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp.,
160 S.W.2d 509, 513 (Tex. 1942))), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 187 S.W.2d 377 (Tex.
1945).
67. The purpose of ERISA's fiduciary provisions is "to make applicable the law of
trusts; ... to establish uniform fiduciary standards to prevent transactions which dissipate
or endanger plan assets; and to provide effective remedies for breaches of trust." 120
CONG. Rac. 29,932 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams, Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, upon introducing the Conference Report H.R. 2); see also
H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N 4639, 4649
(stating that "[t]he fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes applica-
ble to these fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts");
H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N 5038, 5076
(explaining that the ERISA drafters wanted to "apply rules and remedies similar to those
under traditional trust law to govern the conduct of fiduciaries"); S. REP. No. 127, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N 4838, 4871 (stating that Congress
intended to apply the common law of trusts to ERISA "to provide the full range of legal
and equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts").
Prior to ERISA's enactment, courts applied trust law principles in the context of em-
ployee benefits. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089, 1103 (D.D.C. 1971)
(holding that a bank that has actual knowledge of the fiduciary breach by the trustees of a
multiemployer welfare plan is liable for its participation in the trustee's breach). Most
pension and other employee benefit plans were established in the form of a trust. For
example, in 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act provided that multiemployer plans must be in the
form of a trust arrangement. Labor Management Relations Act, § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 186(c)(5) (1988).
68. 716 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984). In Mazzola, the
trustees of a pension fund breached their fiduciary duties by granting a $1.5 million loan to
themselves as trustees of another fund at a below-market interest rate. Id. at 1231-32.
Furthermore, the trustees failed to follow the proper procedures for hiring a consultant to
conduct a feasibility study and imprudently paid that consultant $250,000. Id. at 1234.
69. Id. at 1238-39.
70. Id. at 1235. The district court had ordered the trustees to post a $1 million cash or
corporate surety bond to insure the pension fund against potential losses flowing from the
$1.5 million loan. Id.
71. Id. at 1238-39.
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referred to traditional trust law principles and noted that they provide
broad remedies for fiduciary breaches.72 The court recognized that the
judiciary has a duty to construct the most favorable remedy for the par-
ticipants.73 It determined that because the purpose of the bond remedy
was "to safeguard the beneficiaries' interests," it was consistent with the
common law of trusts,74 and thus consistent with ERISA.75 Similarly,
other courts followed the congressional mandate to apply trust law princi-
ples in their interpretations of ERISA.7 6
B. ERISA's Remedial Scheme
ERISA's purpose is to protect the individual pension rights of partici-
pants and their beneficiaries. 77 It does so, in part, by establishing fiduci-
ary obligations and remedies to address fiduciary breaches.78 The
judiciary is cognizant of ERISA's protective purpose and the breadth of
its provisions.79 Consequently, courts liberally construe the statute to sat-
72. Id. at 1235 (stating that trust law furnishes" 'broad and flexible remedies in cases
involving breaches of fiduciary duty' "(quoting Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 462 (10th Cir.
1982))).
73. Id.
74. Under common law, when there is a breach of trust, "'the court may order the
giving of a bond to secure faithful performance in the future, or may increase the amount
of the existing bond, or may require new sureties.'" Id. at 1236 (quoting GEORGE G.
BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 861, at 11-12
(1982) (footnote omitted)).
75. Id.
76. See infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial application
of trust law to ERISA to find nonfiduciary liability).
77. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA's legislative purpose).
78. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988). This section provides that ERISA safeguards the
interests of participants and beneficiaries "by establishing standards of conduct, responsi-
bility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appro-
priate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts." Id.; see also Pompano
v. Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 680 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir.) (stating that "ERISA's
purpose is to secure guaranteed pension payments to participants by insuring the honest
administration of financially sound plans"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1039 (1982); United
Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. Local 198 AFL-CIO
Pension Plan v. Myers, 488 F. Supp. 704, 709 (M.D. La. 1980), (finding that "[tihe unmis-
takable purpose of [ERISA] was to protect union workers from mismanagement and cor-
ruptive practices of those people selected to oversee their pension plans"), aff'd, 645 F.2d
532 (5th Cir. 1981); Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 436 F. Supp. 1334,
1337 (N.D. Il. 1977) (determining that ERISA "sets safeguards for the operation of cov-
ered plans and establishes standards for the administration of pension plans in an effort to
minimize terminations of pension plans and losses to beneficiaries"), rev'd on other
grounds, 592 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 446 U.S. 359 (1980).
79. See Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 592 F.2d 947, 952 (7th Cir.
1979) (acknowledging that "ERISA was designed to insure benefits which were vested
under the plan terms"), aff'd, 446 U.S. 359 (1980); Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 457 (10th
Cir. 1978) (recognizing that ERISA "is a comprehensive remedial statute designed to 'pro-
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isfy its remedial objective8" and to provide the highest level of protection
to participants and their beneficiaries. 8 '
To enforce the provisions guarding plan participants and beneficiaries,
ERISA furnishes remedies for noncompliance with the statute. Section
501 of ERISA authorizes criminal penalties for certain violations.82 Sec-
tion 502 of ERISA provides six types of civil enforcement provisions that
may be brought against a variety of parties.83 In particular, section
tect . . . the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries' "
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b))); Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 634
(W.D. Wis. 1979) (explaining that courts understand "that ERISA is a comprehensive re-
medial statute designed to protect the pensions and other benefits of employees and have
recognized the broad sweep of its provisions" (citations omitted)).
80. See Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 634 (noting that the congressional committee reports
demonstrate congressional intent to provide the broadest possible remedies under ER-
ISA); see also Eaves, 587 F.2d at 462 (same).
81. See Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 634.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (1988) provides:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of part 1 of this subtitle, or any
regulation or order issued under any such provision, shall upon conviction be
fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; except
that in the case of such violation by a person not an individual, the fine imposed
upon such person shall be a fine not exceeding $100,000.
Id.
83. These six enforcement provisions allow: (1) a participant or beneficiary to recover,
enforce, or clarify his rights under the plan; (2) the Secretary of Labor, participant, benefi-
ciary, or fiduciary to sue to enforce section 409(a) of ERISA; (3) a participant, beneficiary,
or fiduciary to obtain injunctive and other equitable relief; (4) a participant or beneficiary
to recover a penalty of up to $100 per day against an administrator who willfully withholds
information that the participant or beneficiary is entitled to receive; (5) the Secretary of
Labor to obtain injunctive and other equitable relief; and (6) the Secretary of Labor to
collect civil penalties. ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
ERISA Section 502(a) provides, in part:
A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary-
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to en-
force his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appro-
priate relief under section 1109 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or prac-
tice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the
plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate re-
lief in the case of a violation of 1025(c) of this title;
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, by the
Secretary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision
of this subchapter, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i)
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502(a)(2) permits a participant or beneficiary to bring a civil action to
enforce section 409(a) of ERISA on behalf of the pension plan against a
fiduciary who breached his fiduciary duties.8 4 Section 409(a) subjects a
fiduciary who breaches his fiduciary responsibilities under ERISA to per-
sonal liability for damages, restitution, and other appropriate equitable or
remedial relief.8 5 Section 502(a)(3) grants equitable relief to plan partici-
pants and beneficiaries for fiduciary conduct that does not constitute a
fiduciary breach.86 Section 502(l), added to ERISA by the Omnibus
to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of this sub-
chapter; or
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection (c)(2) or
(i) or (1) of this section.
Id.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). For examples of cases interpreting ERISA section
502(a)(2), see Davis v. Kentucky Fin. Cos. Retirement Plan, 887 F.2d 689, 696 (6th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990); McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100, 109 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 971 (1986); Allison v. Dugan, 737 F. Supp. 1043, 1047 (N.D.
Ind. 1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 951 F.2d 828 (7th Cir. 1992); Gray v. Baier, 721 F.
Supp. 326, 327-28 (D.D.C. 1989); Dasler v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 694 F. Supp. 624, 633 (D.
Minn. 1988); Lee v. Prudential Ins. Co., 673 F. Supp. 998, 1003-04 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Smith
v. ABS Indus., Inc., 653 F. Supp. 94, 99 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
85. ERISA section 409(a) provides, in part:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter
shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan result-
ing from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduci-
ary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and
shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1988). For examples of cases interpreting section 409(a), see Guidry
v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 373 (1990); Martin v. Feilen, 965
F.2d 660, 671 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 979 (1993); Useden v. Acker, 947 F.2d
1563, 1580 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993); Dardaganis v. Grace Capi-
tal, Inc., 889 F.2d 1237, 1243 (2d Cir. 1989); Bryant v. International Fruit Prod. Co., 886
F.2d 132, 135 (6th Cir. 1989); Batchelor v. Oak Hill Medical Group, 870 F.2d 1446, 1448
(9th Cir. 1989); American Fed'n of Unions Local 102 Health & Welfare Fund v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y, 841 F.2d 658, 662 (5th Cir. 1988); Martin v. Murphy, 815 F. Supp.
1451, 1453 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Smith v. Rochester Tel. Business Mktg. Corp., 786 F. Supp.
293, 304 (W.D.N.Y. 1992); Dole v. Compton, 753 F. Supp. 563, 566 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Harris
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 49, 51 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
86. ERISA section 502(a)(3) provides in part:
A civil action may be brought-
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice
which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to
obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to
enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan; ....
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988). For examples of cases interpreting section 502(a)(3), see
Kyle Rys., Inc. v. Pacific Admin. Servs., Inc., 990 F.2d 513, 516 (9th Cir. 1993); Warren v.
Society Nat'l Bank, 905 F.2d 975, 983 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991);
Call v. Sumitomo Bank, 881 F.2d 626, 635 (9th Cir. 1989); Painters of Philadelphia Dist.
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Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,87 authorizes the Secretary of Labor to
impose a penalty against fiduciaries or other persons who knowingly par-
ticipate in a breach of fiduciary duty.' The Secretary may assess a pen-
alty of twenty percent of any amounts recovered from the fiduciary or
other person for such breach. 9 Despite ERISA's clear and definite pur-
pose to provide maximum protection for participants and beneficiaries,
some courts still questioned whether this remedial scheme should be
broadly interpreted to include additional remedies.
C. Statutory Interpretation of ERISA's Remedies
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,' the Supreme
Court determined whether a remedy that is not expressly stated in ER-
ISA should be recognized.91 In Russell, a beneficiary sought to bring a
cause of action under section 409(a) of ERISA to impose liability for
punitive damages on a fiduciary for his faulty processing of benefit
claims.92 The Supreme Court held that punitive damages were not avail-
able under section 409(a) because the purpose of imposing personal fidu-
ciary liability is to reimburse the plan, not the individual beneficiary, for
its losses.93 In addition, the Court stated that the statute's text failed to
identify expressly punitive damages as an available remedy.94
Moreover, the Russell Court maintained that the plaintiff failed to sat-
isfy the four-factor test established in Cort v. Ash 9 to determine whether
Council No. 21 Welfare Fund v. Price Waterhouse, 879 F.2d 1146, 1151 n.6 (3d Cir. 1989);
Kleinhaus v. Lisle Sav. Profit Sharing Trust, 810 F.2d 618, 621 (7th Cir. 1987); Sommers
Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456,
1464 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1089 (1987); Capital Mercury Shirt Corp. v.
Employers Reinsurance Corp., 749 F. Supp. 926, 931 (W.D. Ark. 1990); Framingham
Union Hosp., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 744 F. Supp. 29, 32-33 (D. Mass. 1990).
87. Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 2101, 103 Stat. 2123 (1989).
88. See supra note 44 (providing the text of section 502(l)).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l) (Supp. III 1989); see supra note 44.
90. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
91. See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text (outlining ERISA's express
remedies).
92. Russell, 473 U.S. at 136.
93. Id. at 140. The Russell Court determined that
not only is the relevant fiduciary relationship characterized at the outset as one
"with respect to a plan," but the potential personal liability of the fiduciary is "to
make good to such plan and losses to the plan ... and to restore to such plan any
profits of such fiduciary which have been made through the use of assets of the
plan."
Id. (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, at 320 (1974)) (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 144.
95. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (establishing and applying a four-part test to determine
"whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one"). A person
harmed by a violation of a federal statute does not necessarily have an automatic private
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an implied private remedy is available where no explicit private remedy is
provided in the statute.96 The first Cort factor is whether the plaintiff is a
member of the class that Congress intended the statute to benefit.97 In
Russell, the Court implied that Congress enacted ERISA to benefit plain-
tiff beneficiaries of employee benefit plans.98 The second factor is
whether there is evidence of explicit or implicit legislative intent99 to cre-
ate the proposed remedy."°° The Russell Court presumed that Congress
intended to exclude punitive damages as a form of relief because the six
civil enforcement provisions in section 502(a) do not expressly mention
this remedy.10 The third factor is whether the remedy would be consis-
tent with the underlying objectives of the legislative scheme."° In Rus-
sell, the Court found that while Congress designed ERISA's
comprehensive scheme to protect participants and beneficiaries, the stat-
ute does not include an express reference to punitive damages.0 3 The
Court concluded that enforcing such a remedy would be inconsistent with
the statute."° The final Cort factor evaluates the propriety of furnishing
the remedy under federal law when it already is provided under state
cause of action. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979) (applying the
Cori test to determine if an implied right of action exists under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972). The Cort v. Ash four-prong analysis seeks to determine whether
Congress intended that a private remedy be available. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78; see also Cali-
fornia v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287,293-98 (1981) (using the Cori test to determine whether
private parties have an implied cause of action under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770
(1981) (applying the Cori analysis to determine whether a private right of action exists
under the Davis-Bacon Act); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,
15-16 (1979) (employing the Cort test to determine whether the Investment Advisors Act
provides for a private right of action).
96. Russell, 473 U.S. at 145 n.13.
97. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
98. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 145.
99. See infra note 230 (discussing the debate concerning the use of legislative history
in statutory interpretation).
100. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. Cases subsequent to the Cor decision indicate that legislative
intent is the most crucial factor. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 293; Transamerica Mortgage Advi-
sors, 444 U.S. at 23-24; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568, 575-76 (1979).
The Court maintains, however, that the four Cort factors are still the "'criteria through
which this intent could be discerned.'" Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 293 (quoting Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979)).
101. Russell, 473 U.S. at 146 (explaining that because ERISA is a comprehensive stat-
ute, there is little chance that Congress inadvertently omitted a provision regarding puni-
tive damages).
102. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
103. Russell, 473 U.S. at 147-48 (stating that "[i]n contrast to the repeatedly empha-
sized purpose to protect contractually defined benefits, there is a stark absence-in the
statute itself and in its legislative history-of any reference to an intention to authorize the
recovery of extracontractual damages" (footnotes omitted)).
104. Id.
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law.0'0 The Russell Court promptly found that ERISA's broad preemp-
tion of state law satisfies this element."° Accordingly, the Court con-
cluded that section 409(a) of ERISA does not provide a remedy for
punitive damages because such an implied provision would fail to satisfy
the second and third requirements of the Cort test. 7 The Cort analysis
continues to provide essential guidelines for courts engaged in the statu-
tory interpretation of ERISA causes of action.'0 8
D. Varying Views on the Imposition of Nonfiduciary Liability for
Money Damages
Congress intended the courts to develop a body of ERISA common
law based on trust law.'" Courts disagreed, however, as to how to use
trust law to determine issues of nonfiduciary liability and issues of appro-
priate relief. While some courts employed trust law as a basis to impose
nonfiduciary liability and to award the corresponding relief,"0 other
courts ignored trust law and strictly interpreted ERISA to preclude non-
fiduciary liability and its related remedies."'
1. Imposing Nonfiduciary Liability
The seminal case addressing the issue of nonfiduciary liability under
ERISA is Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank."' In Freund, the trustee
fiduciaries of a pension plan allowed most of the plan's assets to be
loaned to its nonfiduciary sponsoring companies in exchange for un-
secured promissory notes.' 3  In a suit against both fiduciaries and
nonfiduciaries, the United States District Court for the Western District
of Wisconsin found that the fiduciary trustees of the pension plan
breached their ERISA fiduciary obligations to the plan's participants and
beneficiaries." 4
105. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
106. Russell, 473 U.S. at 146. ERISA states that its provisions "shall supersede any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
107. Russell, 473 U.S. at 148.
108. See Pension Fund v. Omni Funding Group, 731 F. Supp. 161,177-78 (D.N.J. 1990)
(employing the Cort test to determine "whether ERISA implies a cause of action against
non-fiduciaries").
109, See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA's intended purpose).
110. See infra notes 112-20, 152-60 (discussing judicial decisions imposing nonfiduciary
liability).
111. See infra notes 121-51 (listing decisions rejecting nonfiduciary liability).
112. 485 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
113. Id. at 636.
114. Id. The court held that in doing so, the trustees failed to satisfy their fiduciary duty
of prudence required by ERISA sections 404 (a)(1)(A) and (B). Id.; see also supra note 16
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Pursuant to the congressional mandate to extend the traditional tenets
of trust law to ERISA, 1 5 the Freund court stated that it was authorized
to impose traditional trust law remedies against nonfiduciaries who
knowingly participate in a breach of trust." 6 The court noted that under
trust law, a beneficiary is entitled to be free from third-party interference
with the value of the trust." 7 It also recognized that under trust law, a
third party who aided a trustee in a breach of trust not only could be held
liable for the breach, but also could be held jointly liable for any conse-
quential losses to the trust property."' Based on this reasoning, the court
found that the nonfiduciary sponsoring companies were liable under sec-
tion 409(a) of ERISA for their knowing participation in the fiduciary's
breach of duty."' Four circuit courts subsequently adopted reasoning
similar to Freund,12 ° demonstrating the logic of and necessity for impos-
ing nonfiduciary liability.
and accompanying text. By loaning most of the plan's assets to the sponsoring companies,
they failed to diversify the plan's investment portfolio as required by section 404(a)(1)(C)
of ERISA. Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 636; see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Because the sponsoring companies are defined as "parties in interest," the fiduciaries also
violated sections 406(a)(1)(B) and (D) of ERISA, which prohibit such transactions.
Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 637. Finally, by approving the loan transaction, the fiduciaries
violated sections 406(b)(1) and (2) of ERISA, which prohibit fiduciaries from using plan
assets for their own purposes and from acting, in a transaction involving the plan, on behalf
of a party with adverse interests to the plan. Id. at 637-38.
115. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
116. Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 641-42 (citing the congressional intent to apply the law of
trusts).
117. Id. at 642; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting that beneficiaries
may expect that third parties will not knowingly assist in a trustee's breach).
118. Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 642 (stating that third parties "could be joined in a suit for
the recovery of the value of the trust property lost on account of the breach"); see also
supra note 66 and accompanying text (recognizing that, under the common law of trusts,
nonfiduciaries who aid fiduciaries in a breach of fiduciary duty may be liable for money
damages).
119. Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 642.
120. See Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that
nonfiduciaries are liable for knowingly "aiding and assisting" a fiduciary in breaching his
fiduciary duties); Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, 829 F.2d 1209, 1220 (2d Cir. 1987)
(finding that recovery from nonfiduciaries is based upon traditional principles of the com-
mon law of trusts and on section 502(a)(3) of ERISA); Fink v. National Sav. & Trust Co.,
772 F.2d 951, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (determining that "a district court may award relief
against nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in a breach of trust"); Thornton v. Evans,
692 F.2d 1064, 1079 (7th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that a remedy against nonfiduciaries who
knowingly participate in the breach of a fiduciary's duty "is a necessary development of the
law of ERISA").
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2. Rejecting Nonfiduciary Liability
Despite the Freund rationale and its acceptance among a number of
federal circuits, the Ninth Circuit refused to impose nonfiduciary liability
for damages in Nieto v. Ecker.12 1 In Nieto, the plaintiffs, members of a
labor union, sued their multiemployer funds' attorney for failing to bring
legal actions to collect delinquent contributions and for receiving pay-
ment for services never rendered. 22 The plaintiffs sought relief in the
form of restitution to the fund, injunctive relief, and punitive damages. 23
The Ninth Circuit first determined that the defendant was not a fiduciary
under ERISA.124 The court then held that it would not extend liability
under section 409(a) to nonfiduciaries because the "plain language" of
this section and the language of the statute as a whole did not sustain this
interpretation.
125
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that other circuits imposed nonfiduci-
ary liability in similar cases,' 2 6 but concluded that this was based merely
on Senator Williams' statement that Congress intended to apply relevant
trust law principles and to provide remedies for breaches of trust in ER-
ISA's fiduciary provisions. 127 The Ninth Circuit maintained that this
"nebulous statement" did not justify the incorporation of all trust law
principles into ERISA.128 The court considered the action against the
defendant to be a legal malpractice suit under state tort law that could
not be recharacterized as an action under ERISA simply because the
plaintiffs happened to be plan participants.' 29 The Ninth Circuit also dis-
missed its decision in Donovan v. Mazzola130 as "not on point," despite
the Mazzola court's recognition that Congress based ERISA's fiduciary
provisions on traditional trust law principles and intended the judiciary to
121. 845 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1988).
122. Id. at 870. The district court originally dismissed both the ERISA claim and a
state law fraud claim against the attorney. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing its decision in Yesata v. Baima, 837 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1988)).
125. Id. at 871 (deciding that the Freund decision did not justify a departure from the
statutory language).
126. Id. (stating that "[sleveral courts have nevertheless held that section 409(a) im-
poses liability on non-fiduciaries insofar as they abetted fiduciaries in their breaches of
duty"); see also Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1988); Lowen v. Tower
Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1220-21 (2d Cir. 1987); Fink v. National Sav. &
Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1078 (7th
Cir. 1982); Donovan v. Daugherty, 550 F. Supp. 390, 410-11 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
127. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 871; see supra note 67 (providing a portion of Senator Williams'
statement).
128. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 871.
129. Id. at 871-72.
130. 716 F.2d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); see supra
notes 68-75 and accompanying text (discussing Donovan v. Mazzola).
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use these principles in fashioning remedies for ERISA fiduciary
breaches.'3' Moreover, the Ninth Circuit maintained that section
502(a)(3) of ERISA did not authorize legal relief for nonfiduciary viola-
tions of ERISA because such an interpretation would render section
409(a) unnecessary.
132
The Ninth Circuit did find, however, that the defendant attorney was
liable as a "party in interest"' 33 under ERISA because he furnished serv-
ices to the funds.13 ' As a party in interest, he was liable for participating
131. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 872; see supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text (discussing
Donovan).
132. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 873 (explaining that the rules of statutory construction pre-
vented the court-from interpreting one provision in such a way as to make another super-
fluous); see supra note 85 (providing the text of section 409(a)).
133. ERISA defines "party in interest" as
(A) any fiduciary (including, but not limited to, any administrator, officer,
trustee, or custodian), counsel, or employee of such employee benefit plan;
(B) a person providing services to such plan;
(C) an employer any of whose employees are covered by such plan;
(D) an employee organization any of whose members are covered by such plan;
(E) an owner, direct or indirect, of 50 percent or more of-
(i) the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or the
total value of shares of all classes of stock of a corporation,
(ii) the capital interest or the profits interest of a partnership, or
(iii) the beneficial interest of a trust or unincorporated enterprise,which is
an employer or an employee organization described in subparagraph (C) or
(D);
(F) a relative (as defined in paragraph (15)) of any individual described in sub-
paragraph (A), (B), (C), or (E);
(G) a corporation, partnership, or trust or estate of which (or in which) 50 per-
cent or more of-
(i) the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or the
total value of shares of all classes of stock of such corporation,
(ii) the capital interest or profits interest of such partnership, or
(iii) the beneficial interest of such trust or estate, is owned directly or indi-
rectly, or held by persons described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or
(E);
(H) an employee, officer, director (or an individual having powers or responsi-
bilities similar to those of officers or directors), or a 10 percent or more
shareholder directly or indirectly, of a person described in subparagraph
(B), (C), (D), (E), or (G), or of the employee benefit plan; or
(I) a 10 percent or more (directly or indirectly in capital or profits) partner or
joint venturer of a person described in subparagraph (B), (C), (D), (E), or
(G).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (1988).
134. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 873.
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in a "prohibited transaction"'135 with the plan fiduciary.' 36 Consequently,
the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the lower court to determine the
extent of his equitable obligations as a party in interest under section
502(a)(3). 37
In contrast, a concurring opinion disagreed with the majority's analysis
in Nieto. The concurrence asserted that the defendant was not only liable
as a party in interest but also as a nonfiduciary under section 409(a).
138
Recognizing that section 409(a) must be read in the context of the entire
statute, which Congress enacted to provide beneficiaries with extensive
remedies,'139 the concurring opinion found that the legislative intent
urged courts to apply the law of trusts in ERISA actions. 140 The concur-
ring opinion argued that Senator Williams' speech, as well as the Senate
and House committee reports, illustrated this intent.14' Furthermore, the
concurrence stated that the Mazzola decision was relevant because, in
that case, the court used its broad ERISA-delegated authority to extend a
trust law remedy to ERISA section 409(a), thereby forcing the defend-
ants to post a one million dollar bond to protect against the plan's
losses. 42 Nieto was a surprising divergence from the position taken by
the other circuits that had already addressed this issue.
135. Under ERISA, prohibited transactions include, inter alia: (1) the sale or exchange,
or lease of property between a plan and a disqualified person or party in interest, ERISA
§ 406(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(A) (1988); (2) loans and extensions of credit be-
tween the plan and any disqualified person or party in interest, ERISA § 406(a)(1)(B), 29
U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(B) (1988); (3) goods furnished, services rendered, or facilities provided
between the plan and a disqualified person or a party in interest, ERISA § 406(a)(1)(C),
29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C) (1988); (4) a fiduciary's act of transferring or using the income
and assets of a plan in his or her personal interest, ERISA § 406(b)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1106(b)(1) (1988); and (5) a fiduciary's act involving the plan on behalf of a party whose
interests are adverse to the interests of the plan or its participants and beneficiaries, ER-
ISA § 406(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(2) (1988).
136. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 873.
137. Id. at 874 (stating that "if plaintiffs prevail on the merits, they will be entitled to
whatever equitable relief-including issuance of an injunction or the imposition of a con-
structive trust upon property improperly received").
138. Id. at 874-75 (Wiggins, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 875 (acknowledging that Congress intended "to provide the broadest possi-
ble remedies under ERISA to plan beneficiaries").
140. Id. (finding support for this proposition in Senator Williams' statement, as well as
in committee reports and other forms of legislative history).
141. Id.; see supra note 67 (providing a portion of Senator Williams' statement and the
relevant language of committee reports).
142. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 875 (quoting Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984)); see supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text
(discussing the Donovan decision).
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3. Reactions to Nieto- Circuits Take Opposite Positions
Following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Nieto, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also found that nonfiduciaries were
not liable for money damages in Useden v. Acker. 43 In an analysis simi-
lar to that employed by the Nieto court,'" the Eleventh Circuit examined
the text of the statute for language expressly authorizing such liability.
145
Finding none, the court refused to interpret the ERISA provisions
broadly to include nonfiduciary liability for money damages.' 46 Unlike
the Ninth Circuit in Nieto, the Useden court acknowledged that the
Supreme Court expressly provided for the application of traditional trust
law principles to the development of ERISA federal common law. 47 The
Eleventh Circuit, however, qualified this assertion by stating that ERISA
federal common law would only adopt a principle of trust law if the statu-
tory language did not intentionally exclude the provision from the stat-
ute. 1 48  The court determined that it could not derive nonfiduciary
liability for money damages from section 409(a) because Congress ex-
pressly limited the section's application to fiduciaries. 149 Similarly, the
court found that it could not include liability for money damages in sec-
tion 502(a)(3) because Congress restricted that section to equitable reme-
dies.' 150 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that there could not be an
ERISA cause of action for money damages against a nonfiduciary be-
cause the statute's text effectively precluded such a remedy and Congress
had remained silent on the issue.' 5 '
143. 947 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993).
144. See supra notes 121-37 (discussing the Nieto decision).
145. Useden, 947 F.2d at 1580 (beginning the analysis with a "search [of] ERISA's text
for any language plainly extending liability to nonfiduciaries").
146. Id. (declining to broadly interpret a single section, thereby making it inconsistent
with the overall statutory scheme).
147. Id. at 1580 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989)).
The Bruch court explained that
ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust law. ERISA's legis-
lative history confirms that the Act's fiduciary responsibility provisions "codif[y]
and mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the
evolution of the law of trusts." Given this language and history, we have held
that courts are to develop a "federal common law of rights and obligations under
ERISA-regulated plans."
Bruch, 489 U.S. at 110 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N 4639, 4649).
148. Useden, 947 F.2d at 1581.
149. Id. at 1580 (finding that " '[t]he plain language of section 409(a) limits its coverage
to fiduciaries, and nothing in the statute provides any support for holding others liable
under that section' " (quoting Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1988))).
150. Id. at 1581.
151. Id. at 1582. The court stated:
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Conversely, in accord with Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank,'5 2 other
courts continued to hold nonfiduciaries liable for knowingly participating
in a breach of fiduciary duty.'53 In Whitfield v. Lindemann, 54 for exam-
ple, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held a nonfi-
duciary attorney, who had accepted overvalued assets from the plan's
previous trustees, jointly and severally liable with the plan fiduciary for
losses suffered by the plan. 155 The court concluded that the attorney's
liability could extend beyond the personal benefit he derived from the
transaction. 56 Similarly, in Pension Fund v. Omni Funding Group,57 the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held a nonfi-
duciary bank, which the fiduciary had employed to manage plan assets,
liable for knowingly participating in a design to enrich the fiduciary. 5
Applying the four-factor Cort v. Ash test, 59 the district court recognized
an implied cause of action under ERISA against nonfiduciaries because it
found that ERISA's remedial provisions should be broadly construed to
protect the interests of participants and beneficiaries.
16
[i]t is telling that, despite textual treatment of non-fiduciaries in various other
parts of the ERISA scheme, provisions relevant to appellant's theory contain no
textual support for a claim for monetary damages against non-fiduciaries. We
cannot infer that Congress's silence is accidental in an area where Congress has
already said so much out loud.
Id. at 1581-82
152. 485 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Wis. 1979); see supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text
(discussing the reasoning of the Freund decision).
153. See infra text accompanying notes 154-60 (providing examples where courts im-
posed nonfiduciary liability following Nieto).
154. 853 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1089 (1989).
155. Id. at 1307. In this case, the Department of Labor charged a trustee of a pension
plan and his attorney with fiduciary violations for accepting assets overvalued by $775,551
from former trustees in satisfaction of the trust's claims against them. Id. at 1302.
156. Id. at 1303 (rejecting the attorney's argument that his liability was limited to his
personal gain).
157. 731 F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1990). In Pension Fund, a qualified ERISA pension fund
alleged that a brokerage firm and bank conspired to misdirect and misappropriate its pen-
sion assets. Id. at 164.
158. Id. at 179.
159. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text (delineating the four factors of the
Cort v. Ash test and discussing their application in Russell).
160. Pension Fund, 731 F. Supp. at 177-79 (holding that "ERISA. does provide a rem-
edy against nonfiduciaries . . . [because] ERISA is a comprehensive remedial statute
designed to protect the interests of participants and beneficiaries").
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II. MERTENS V. HEWITT ASSOCIATEs A NARROW INTERPRETATION
OF ERISA PRECLUDING NONFIDUCIARY LIABILITY FOR
MONEY DAMAGES
In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,161 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue dividing the federal courts regarding whether section
502(a)(3) of ERISA includes a cause of action for money damages
against nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in the breach of a fidu-
ciary's duties.'62 The Court adopted the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits'
stricter interpretations of ERISA and rejected such a cause of action.'
63
The Court's narrow focus on explicit statutory language overlooked ER-
ISA's fundamental purpose to provide financially secure retirement ben-
efits."6 As a result, Mertens provides less protection for participants and
beneficiaries than they had received prior to ERISA's enactment. 65
A. The Majority Opinion: A Deliberate Exclusion
The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, adopted the minority
position espoused by the Ninth Circuit in holding that a cause of action
for money damages against nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in
the breach of a fiduciary's duties does not exist under ERISA.' 66 First,
the Court concluded, as the Ninth Circuit had in Nieto v. Ecker, 67 that
nonfiduciary liability under section 409(a) of ERISA does not exist be-
cause the provision making a fiduciary "personally liable for damages ('to
make good to [the] plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such
breach')" applied exclusively to fiduciaries. 168 Because the petitioners
did not challenge the Ninth Circuit's finding that the respondent was not
a fiduciary, 169 and because section 409(a) contains no express provisions
161. 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993). Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, Souter and Thomas joined
Justice Scalia's majority opinion, while Justices Stevens and O'Connor joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion. Id. at 2065.
162. Id. at 2066; see supra note 86 (providing the text of section 502(a)(3)).
163. See infra notes 166-201 and accompanying text (providing a full discussion of the
majority opinion); see also supra notes 121-42 and accompanying text (discussing Nieto);
supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text (discussing Useden).
164. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining ERISA's purpose).
165. See infra notes 254-62 and accompanying text (contending that Mertens will pro-
vide less security for participants and their beneficiaries).
166. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2072 (finding that "ERISA has eliminated ... all direct and
consequential damages suffered by the plan, on the part of persons who had no real power
to control what the plan did").
167. 845 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1988); see supra notes 121-42 and accompanying text
(providing a detailed discussion of Nieto).
168. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2066 (quoting ERISA section 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a))
(alteration in original).
169. Id. at 2067.
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providing a remedy of money damages against nonfiduciaries, 170 the
Court denied the relief.
171
The Court then examined section 502(a)(3) to determine if it explicitly
or implicitly provides a money damages remedy against nonfiduciaries.172
Section 502(a)(3) provides, in part, that equitable remedies may be avail-
able to provide relief for ERISA violations and to enforce ERISA's pro-
visions. 173  Although Congress expressly authorized liability for the
knowing participation of cofiduciaries, the Court found that section
502(a)(3) contains no explicit provision concerning nonfiduciary liability
for damages.' 74 The Court concluded that the nonfiduciary liability ex-
clusion probably was deliberate in light of the imposition of such liability
on both cofiduciaries and nonfiduciaries under the common law of
trusts. 7
170. See supra note 85 (providing the text of section 409(a)).
171. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2067 (maintaining, after discussing the causes of action and
remedies available against fiduciaries, that there are no "equivalent provisions specifying
nonfiduciaries as potential defendants, or damages as a remedy available").
172. Id.
173. See supra note 86 (providing the text of section 502(a)(3)).
174. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2067 (stating that "while ERISA contains various provisions
that can be read as imposing obligations upon nonfiduciaries, including actuaries, no provi-
sion explicitly requires them to avoid participation (knowing or unknowing) in a fiduciary's
breach of fiduciary duty" (footnote omitted)).
ERISA explicitly imposes liability for cofiduciary breaches of fiduciary duty. Section
405(a) states:
In addition to any liability which he may have under any other provisions of
this part, a fiduciary with respect to a plan shall be liable for a breach of fiduciary
responsibility of another fiduciary with respect to the same plan in the following
circumstances:
(1) if he participates knowingly in, or knowingly undertakes to conceal, an act
or omission of such other fiduciary, knowing such act or omission is a breach;
(2) if, by his failure to comply with section 1104(a)(1) of this title in the ad-
ministration of his specific responsibilities which give rise to his status as a fiduci-
ary, he has enabled such other fiduciary to commit a breach; or
(3) if he has knowledge of a breach by such other fiduciary, unless he makes
reasonable efforts under the circumstances to remedy the breach.
29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1988).
175. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2067. The Court maintained that "[it is unlikely ... that this
was an oversight, since ERISA does explicitly impose 'knowing participation' liability on
cofiduciaries" and this "limitation appears all the more deliberate in light of the fact that
'knowing participation' liability on the part of both cotrustees and third persons was well
established under the common law of trusts." Id. (citations omitted) (quoting ERISA
§ 405(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1988)); see also supra note 66 and accompanying text (dem-
onstrating the availability of a damages remedy under the common law of trusts against
nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in a trustee's breach of fiduciary duty).
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In addition, the Court found that traditional equitable relief does not
include money damages, an instrument of legal relief.'76 Although the
Court had not interpreted the phrase "other appropriate equitable relief"
in the context of ERISA, it analogized this expression to its construction
of the phrase " 'any other equitable relief as the court deems appropri-
ate' " in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits the
imposition of punitive damages. 77 The Court acknowledged that under
the common law of trusts in courts of equity, beneficiaries could obtain a
money damages remedy against nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate
in a breach of a fiduciary's duty.178 Equitable relief, therefore, could be
interpreted as any form of relief an equity court was authorized to
grant. 79 The Court, however, elected to construe equitable relief as re-
ferring to general equitable remedies, such as "injunction, mandamus,
and restitution, but not compensatory damages.' 80 The Court reasoned
that if Congress had intended all forms of relief to be available for a
breach of trust under ERISA, the statutory language would not have ex-
pressly limited the remedies to equitable relief.' A broader interpreta-
tion, the Court reasoned, would render the word "equitable"
"superfluous.' 182 Furthermore, the Court maintained that defining equi-
176. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2068 (determining that the petitioners, in reality, were seek-
ing money damages).
177. Id. at 2068 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988)).
178. Id. The Court admitted that "at common law, the courts of equity had exclusive
jurisdiction over virtually all actions by beneficiaries for breach of trust" and "that money
damages were available in those courts against the trustee, and against third persons who
knowingly participated in the trustee's breach." Id. (citations omitted); see also supra
notes 62-66 and accompanying text (regarding nonfiduciary liability under the common law
of trusts).
179. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2068-69.
180. Id. at 2069 (distinguishing between those forms of relief that equity courts were
authorized to provide and those types that typically were available).
181. Id. (stating that "[s]ince all relief available for breach of trust could be obtained
from a court of equity, limiting the sort of relief obtainable under § 502(a)(3) to 'equitable
relief' in the sense of 'whatever relief a common-law court of equity could provide in such
a case' would limit the relief not at all" (footnote omitted)); see also supra note 61 (discuss-
ing the availability of both legal and equitable remedies for breaches of trustee). The ma-
jority also indicated that, at the time Congress enacted ERISA, punitive damages were not
a major issue. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2069 n.7.
182. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2069; see also United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
1011 (1992) (stating that a statute should "be construed in such fashion that every word has
some operative effect"); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 539 (1955) (recognizing
that the Court has a "duty 'to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a stat-
ute'" (quoting Inhabitants of Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883))); Mail Or-
der Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding that
courts must interpret statutes such that "no provision is rendered 'inoperative or superflu-
ous, void or insignificant'" (quoting Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704
F.2d 1280, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1983))); Gonzalez v. McNary, 980 F.2d 1418, 1420 (11th Cir.
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table relief to include all forms of relief under common law would give
the phrase "a different meaning than it bears elsewhere in ERISA," and
would obscure the distinction between "equitable" and "remedial" or
"legal" relief elsewhere in the statute.'83 The Court concluded that its
mandate to develop ERISA federal common law did not authorize it to
alter the statute's text.184
The Court also asserted that the addition of section 502(1) to ERISA 185
did not create a remedy against nonfiduciaries for money damages.'
86
Section 502(l) allows the Secretary of Labor to "assess a civil penalty...
in an amount equal to 20 percent of the applicable recovery amount"'
87
against nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in a fiduciary breach.' 88
Section 502(a)(5) 89 authorizes the Secretary to provide "appropriate eq-
uitable relief," corresponding to the same language in section 502(a)(3)
referring to private actions.'" The Court stated that equitable relief
under section 502(a)(5) encompasses restitution and that cofiduciaries in-
clude "other person[s]" besides nonfiduciaries.' 9 ' The Court also noted
that the proposed regulation implementing Section 502(1) distinguishes
between equitable relief and money damages. 92 Consequently, the
Court found that the text of section 502(l) does not establish a remedy for
damages against nonfiduciaries under section 502(a)(5). 19 3
1993) (same); Board of Trustees of Trucking Employees of New Jersey Welfare Fund-
Pension Fund v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 1992) (same); In re Kitchen Equip. Co.,
960 F.2d 1242, 1247 (4th Cir. 1992) (same); Boise Cascade Corp. v. EPA, 942 F.2d 1427,
1432 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); Beef Nebraska, Inc. v. United States, 807 F.2d 712, 717 (8th
Cir. 1986) (same).
183. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2069-70.
184. Id. at 2070 (stating that "[t]he authority of courts to develop a 'federal common
law' under ERISA is not the authority to revise the text of the statute" (citation omitted)).
185. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(1) (Supp. III 1991); see supra note 44 (providing the text of sec-
tion 502(l)).
186. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2071.
187. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l); see supra note 44 (providing the text of section 502(l)).
188. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2070.
189. Section 502(a)(5) provides: "except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this
section, by the Secretary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of
this subchapter, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such viola-
tion or (ii) to enforce any provision of this subchapter;. .. ." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5) (1988).
190. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2070; see supra note 52 (providing text of Section 502(a)(3)).
Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5) (1988) with 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988).
191. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2071 (explaining that section 502(a)(5) "includes restitution
of ill-gotten plan assets or profits, providing an 'applicable recovery amount' to use to
calculate the penalty"); see supra note 189 (providing text of section 502(a)(5)).
192. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2071 (citing 55 Fed. Reg. 25,288, 25,289 and n.9 (1990) to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2560.502(l)-i).
193. Id. (refusing to expand the meaning of "equitable relief").
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The majority rejected the argument that its narrow construction of the
appropriate equitable remedies contradicted ERISA's purpose of pro-
tecting participants and beneficiaries and afforded these individuals less
protection than before ERISA was enacted. 194 The Court reasoned that
the statute's purpose was "vague" and did not outweigh an interpretation
of specific text in the context of a particular issue. 195 The Court stated
that this was true especially in the context of ERISA because Congress
enacted a comprehensive statute to balance contentions between "power-
ful competing interests" without always reaching a favorable outcome for
the claimants. 196 The majority determined that professional service prov-
iders will be liable for money damages only when "they cross the line"
from their initial role to a fiduciary capacity. 197 At that point,
nonfiduciaries become fiduciaries and may be liable for money dam-
ages.'98 The Court explained that the statute still provides traditional
forms of equitable relief, such as restitution. 99 The Court also reasoned
that imposing greater liability on professional service providers in this
context would result in increased insurance costs, thereby increasing the
total costs for the plans.2" Accordingly, the Court refused to modify the
existing balance between ERISA's competing objectives of protecting
employees and controlling the costs of pension plans.2 '
B. The Dissenting Opinion: A Broad Interpretation to Make the
Victim Whole
The dissent, written by Justice White, agreed with the position adopted
in Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank2" 2 and construed section 502(a)(3) of
194. Id. (stating that specific statutory language is more probative than broad
purposes).
195. Id. (reasoning that "vague notions of a statute's 'basic purpose' are nonetheless
inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding the specific issue under
consideration").
196. Id.
197. Id. (stating that "[p]rofessional service providers such as actuaries become liable
for damages when they cross the line from advisor to fiduciary").
198. Id.; see supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text (defining fiduciary responsibili-
ties and liability under ERISA).
199. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2072; see supra note 29 (analyzing traditional equitable rem-
edies); supra note 45 (discussing restitution).
200. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2072.
201. Id. The Court explained that there is a "'tension between the primary [ERISA]
goal of benefitting employees and the subsidiary goal of containing pension costs.'" Id.
(alteration in the original) (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 515
(1981)). The Court therefore concluded that it would "not attempt to adjust the balance
between those competing goals that the text adopted by Congress has struck." Id.
202. 485 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Wis. 1979); see supra notes 112-20 (discussing the Freund
decision).
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ERISA to hold nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in a fiduciary
breach liable for money damages to make a plan beneficiary "whole."2' 3
First, the dissent reasoned that this interpretation of ERISA's fiduciary
provisions corresponded with the traditional principles of trust law.2"
The dissent noted that the statute's language includes many trust law
terms2 ° 5 and determined that Congress wanted the judiciary to look to
the common law of trusts for guidance in construing ERISA's provi-
sions."° The dissent also found that in the common law of trusts, courts
of equity provided both equitable and legal remedies, including money
damages, to ensure that the beneficiaries received complete relief.2"7 The
dissent concluded that the phrase "appropriate equitable relief" found in
section 502(a)(3) includes all of the remedies traditionally available in
equity for breaches of trust.208 These remedies include money damages
for both fiduciary and nonfiduciary liability to make the participant or
beneficiary whole. 2 9 Accordingly, the dissent reasoned that this result
would confer the same level of protection to participants and benefi-
ciaries under ERISA as they had received prior to its enactment.
210
Furthermore, the dissent interpreted appropriate equitable relief to be
a "descriptive" reference to all equitable remedies available under tradi-
tional trust law.2 1' While Congress distinguished equitable from legal re-
lief in other provisions, the dissent argued that only section 502(a)(3) had
203. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2078 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor, asserted that "[t]he text of the
statute supports a reading of § 502(a)(3) that would permit a court to award compensatory
monetary relief where necessary to make an ERISA beneficiary whole for a breach of
trust." Id.; see supra note 52 (providing text of section 502(a)(3)); see also supra notes 112-
20, 152-60 and accompanying text (reviewing federal decisions that have adopted nonfidu-
ciary liability).
204. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2078; see supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the relevant trust law concepts).
205. See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text (providing ERISA's remedial
scheme).
206. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2073.
207. Id. at 2074 (explaining that equity authorized "the payment of a monetary award
to make the victims of the breach whole"); see also BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 57,
§ 870; supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing nonfiduciary liability for money
damages for knowing participation in a breach of trust).
208. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2074. Justice White declared that "§ 502(a)(3)'s reference to
,appropriate equitable relief' " embraced "equity's routine remedy for such breaches-a
compensatory monetary award calculated to make the victims whole, a remedy that was
available against both fiduciaries and participating nonfiduciaries." Id.
209. Id. (noting that such a construction would eliminate the possibility of construing
ERISA in such a way as to contradict its legislative purpose).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 2075. The dissent asserted that the term equitable is "descriptive and simply
refer[s] to all remedies available in equity under the common law of trusts, whether or not
they were or are the exclusive remedies for breach of trust." Id.
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a foundation in the common law of trusts.212 According to the dissent,
even if Congress intended to make a similar distinction in this area, equi-
table relief would still encompass all equitable remedies available under
the common law of trusts.213 For example, a punitive damages remedy
was not a traditional equitable remedy available at common law in breach
of trust cases. 214 This is consistent with the Court's decision in Massachu-
setts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,215 where the Court held that
punitive damages are not a remedy available under ERISA.216 Punitive
damages, however, were available as a legal remedy under the common
law of trusts.2 7 Recently, courts have used" 'legal' powers" to authorize
punitive damages, even though historically the action could only have
been equitable, because modern courts use both legal and equitable au-
thority to award a remedy for breach of trust.218 The dissent concluded
that the Court may interpret section 502(a)(3) of ERISA to authorize an
award of money damages against nonfiduciaries who knowingly partici-
pate in a fiduciary breach to make a participant or beneficiary whole.219
III. MERTENS IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE CORT V. ASH STANDARD
AND OTHER POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The majority's holding in Mertens is inconsistent with the origins, lan-
guage, and purpose of ERISA, which serve to provide participants and
their beneficiaries with maximum retirement security and protection.22 °
The Supreme Court, in an opinion focusing on strict statutory interpreta-
tion rather than the foundation and function of ERISA, concluded that
the statute does not authorize money damages for nonfiduciary liabil-
ity.22' This decision jeopardizes the retirement security for participants
and their beneficiaries.
212. Id. (stating that ERISA's other remedial provisions lacked "any discernible ana-
logue in the common law").
213. Id. at 2075-76 (noting that the courts of equity were not authorized to grant all
forms of relief).
214. Id. at 2076 (explaining that in a breach of trust case at common law, the plaintiffs
could recover compensatory damages, but not punitive or exemplary damages).
215. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
216. Id. at 148; see supra notes 90-108 and accompanying text (providing a detailed
discussion of Russell).
217. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2076.
218. Id. at 2077 (noting that courts cite the merger of law and equity as a justification
for the exercise of this power).
219. Id. at 2078.
220. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative purpose of
ERISA).
221. See supra notes 166-201 and accompanying text (reviewing the majority opinion in
Mertens).
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A. The Majority Opinion Conflicts with the Cort v. Ash Standard
The four-part test developed in Cort v. Ash,222 and applied in Massa-
chusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,223 determines whether a
remedy may be implied where a statute does not explicitly award it.
224
Even assuming that "equitable relief" in section 502(a)(3) does not in-
clude a money damages remedy, an application of the Cort v. Ash analy-
sis in the context of Mertens implies such a remedy and illustrates the
fundamental flaws in the majority's reasoning and ultimate conclusion.
1. Federal Right for the Plaintiff
The first Cort factor considers whether the statute creates a federal
right for the benefit of the plaintiff.225 In making this determination, the
Court should examine the statutory language.226 In Mertens, the majority
failed to address the existence of a federal right for participants and bene-
ficiaries. It is explicitly clear, however, in ERISA's statutory language227
and legislative history22 that Congress enacted the statute for the benefit
of participants and beneficiaries. Moreover, the Russell Court expressly
verified that a beneficiary of an employee benefit plan possessed a fed-
eral right under ERISA.229 Based on ERISA's language, legislative his-
tory, and interpretive case law, it is evident that participants and their
beneficiaries possess the requisite ERISA federal right.
222. 422 U.S. 66,78 (1975); see supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text (detailing the
Cort analysis).
223. 473 U.S. 134 (1985); see supra notes 89-108 and accompanying text (applying the
Cort test to the facts of Russell).
224. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78; see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
225. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
226. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979) (stating that
Congress intends to create a cause of action "where the language of the statute explicitly
confer[s] a right directly on a class of persons that include[s] the plaintiff in the case").
227. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA's purpose to safe-
guard participants and beneficiaries under section 401(b) of ERISA).
228. See supra note 9 (providing the relevant legislative history concerning ERISA's
purpose); supra note 67 (discussing Congress' intent to apply trust law to ERISA's fiduci-
ary provisions).
229. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145 (1985) (stating that a
beneficiary "is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted").
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2. Legislative Intent
The second Cort factor analyzes whether there is explicit or implicit
legislative intent230 to establish the remedy sought."' This factor is the
focal point of the Cort analysis.232 In Mertens, following its reasoning in
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,2 33 the Court stated
that ERISA's comprehensive remedial scheme demonstrated Congress'
intent to make the express remedies exclusive. 3 Thus, because there are
no express provisions addressing nonfiduciary liability for knowing par-
ticipation in a fiduciary breach, the Court determined that a money dam-
ages remedy does not exist.235
230. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). There is debate over the use of legislative
history in statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia and other proponents of the "plain mean-
ing" rule argue that if the statutory language is ambiguous, the judge must rationalize
"whether one possible meaning of a term comports better with the rest of the statute in
question," rather than consulting legislative history. Note, Why Learned Hand Would
Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1005, 1005 (1992). Support-
ers of this view reason that the Constitution limits Congress' role in passing laws. Arthur
Stock, Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation:
How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160, 166. The law does not incorporate legis-
lative history because Congress does not subject it to a vote. Id. Courts have the authority
to review only the law, not legislative history. Id. Supporters also argue that legislative
history is an inadequate source because congressional staff members create legislative his-
tory, not the Members of Congress. Id. at 163.
Nevertheless, there are many compelling arguments supporting the judicial analysis of
legislative history. Context is critical to fully comprehend the meaning of words, especially
in the case of complex and technical statutes where an understanding of policy is impor-
tant. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277,
301 (1990). Other sources of interpretation of congressional intent often are inadequate.
Id. at 303. Moreover, when a judge rationalizes the meaning of statutory language, he
effectively "substitutes the legislative meaning with one created by an unelected judge
whose constitutional role is limited to deciding cases, not rewriting laws to fit his own sense
of rationality." Stock, supra, at 172-73. Furthermore, legislative history production is not
left to the sole discretion of congressional staffers. Id. at 174. All three branches of gov-
ernment participate in drafting written materials that are compiled by staff members, while
Congress has specific procedural and substantive rules governing the production of com-
mittee reports. Id. Even if the courts misinterpreted legislative history, Congress can en-
act amendments to override these misinterpretations. Wald, supra, at 308.
231. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
232. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (indicating the importance of legislative
intent in the Cort analysis).
233. Russell, 473 U.S. at 134; see supra notes 90-108 and accompanying text (providing
a detailed discussion of Russell).
234. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 113 S. Ct. 2063, 2067 (1993); see also Russell, 473 U.S.
at 146-47.
235. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2067.
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Section 502(l) of ERISA exemplifies the implicit legislative intent to
create a remedy for monetary damages against nonfiduciaries. 236 This
section allows the Secretary to assess a civil penalty not only against fidu-
ciaries who commit fiduciary breaches, but also against other persons
who knowingly participate in a fiduciary breach.237 In addition, this sec-
tion defines the civil penalty as amounts the Secretary obtains from
"other person[s]" under section 502(a)(5) of ERISA.238 Therefore, sec-
tion 502(1) is based upon the Secretary's ability to obtain "other appropri-
ate equitable relief" under section 502(a)(5).239 Because the Secretary's
authority to assess a civil penalty under section 502(l) is based upon the
same language as that which appears in section 502(a)(3), section
502(a)(3) implicitly authorizes private causes of action against
nonfiduciaries for money damages. The majority in Mertens, however,
rejected this interpretation.24 ° The Court merely dismissed the fact that
Congress intended courts to award both equitable and legal relief for par-
ticipants and beneficiaries under section 502(l).241
Furthermore, ERISA's legislative history demonstrates Congress' in-
tent to invoke a remedy for money damages against nonfiduciaries. The
legislative history indicates that Congress intended the courts to rely
upon traditional trust law principles in developing ERISA federal com-
mon law.242 Therefore, the Court must examine the common law of
236. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l) (Supp. III 1991); see supra note 44 and accompanying text
(providing the text of section 502(1)).
237. See supra note 44.
238. See supra note 44; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5) (1988); supra note 189 (provid-
ing the text of section 502(a)(5)).
239. See supra note 44; see also supra note 189.
240. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 113 S. Ct. 2063, 2070 (1993).
241. Id. Cf Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270, 280 (2d Cir.
1992) (stating that " '[it remains the intent of Congress that the courts use their power [to]
fashion legal and equitable remedies that not only protect participants and beneficiaries
but deter violations of the law as well' " (alterations in original) (quoting H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 433, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 3018, 3036)).
242. See Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2073; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
101, 110-11 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 533, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649 (stating that "[t]he fiduciary responsibility section, in essence,
codifies and makes applicable to these fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolu-
tion of the law of trusts"); supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing Congress'
intent); see also Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central
Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570-71 (1985) (referring to the common law of trusts in defining
a trustee's powers and responsibilities).
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the need to generate federal
common law where "a federal rule of decision is 'necessary to protect uniquely federal
interests.' " Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (quot-
ing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964)). The Court also has
acknowledged the need to develop federal common law where "Congress has given the
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trusts to interpret "appropriate equitable relief" as it appears in section
502(a)(3) of ERISA.243 This conclusion is supported by the rules of stat-
utory interpretation, which dictate that where Congress uses language
with "accumulated settled meaning," a court must assume that Congress
intended to use that established meaning in the statute. 2 " The majority
in Mertens chose to limit the meaning of equitable relief to its general
definition, embracing only injunction, mandamus, and restitution.245 The
true, settled meaning of the term "equitable relief" in the context of the
common law of trusts, however, includes awards that make breach of
trust victims whole, since traditional equity courts could award legal rem-
edies to enforce a trust.246 Furthermore, in the common law of trusts,
beneficiaries may recover money damages against third parties who
knowingly participate in a fiduciary breach.247 Because Congress in-
tended the courts to apply the established meaning of terms according to
the common law of trusts, 248 and because nonfiduciary liability for money
damages in equity is entrenched firmly in trust law,2 49 it is clear that Con-
gress intended to create this remedy under ERISA.
3. Underlying Purposes
The third factor of the Cort test is whether the proposed remedy would
be consistent with the underlying purposes of the statute.250 ERISA's
explicit underlying purpose is to protect the interests of participants and
courts the power to develop substantive law." Id. (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S.
647, 652 (1963)).
243. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 157 (1985) (empha-
sizing that in analyzing "questions concerning appropriate relief under ERISA, courts
should begin by ascertaining the extent to which trust and pension law as developed by
state and federal courts provide for recovery"); see also supra note 52 and accompanying
text (providing the text of section 502(a)(3)).
244. See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981); Perrin v. United States,
444 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1979).
245. See Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2069; see DOBBS, supra note 29, § 2.1(1), at 48 (explain-
ing the distinction between legal and equitable remedies).
246. See Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2068. The majority stated that equitable relief could
refer to "whatever relief a court of equity is empowered to provide in the particular case at
issue" and its meaning is "a question of interpretation." Id. at 2068-69.
247. Id. at 2074; see also supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (discussing tradi-
tional trust law remedies against third parties).
248. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (demonstrating congressional intent to
apply trust law principles to ERISA's fiduciary provisions).
249. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (demonstrating the availability of a
money damages remedy against nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in fiduciary
breaches).
250. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); see supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text
(applying the third Cort factor in the context of Russell).
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beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.25' Despite the clear indications
of this purpose in legislative history and case law, the majority in Mertens
promptly dismissed the statute's purpose as "vague" and declared that
ERISA's goal was to balance the interests of all parties concerned.252 In
fact, the Court appeared to express a greater concern for nonfiduciaries
who might be subject to higher insurance premiums as a result of greater
liability than for the participants and beneficiaries who are the victims of
a breach.253 The purpose of ERISA's enforcement provisions is to make
participants and beneficiaries whole in the context of the common law of
trusts.254 Under the common law, courts of equity held nonfiduciaries
who knowingly participate in a fiduciary breach liable for compensatory
money damages to make a beneficiary whole.255 In addition, other reme-
dies may not be available where ERISA preempts state law.2 6 If money
damages against nonfiduciaries are unavailable, participants and benefi-
ciaries will have less protection than they had prior to ERISA's enact-
ment, contravening ERISA's purpose to provide greater protection for
these parties.257 Thus, appropriate equitable relief must include money
damages against nonfiduciaries.
4. Appropriateness of a State Law Cause of Action
The final Cort factor examines whether it is more appropriate for a
party to bring the proposed cause of action under state law rather than
251. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2072; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988); Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 157 (1985); see supra notes 9, 78 and accompa-
nying text (discussing ERISA's purpose).
252. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2071.
253. Id. at 2072 (noting that greater nonfiduciary liability "would impose high insurance
costs upon persons who regularly deal with and offer advice to ERISA plans"); see also
DOL Urges Overturn of Mertens; Says Ruling Will Hamper Enforcement, [July-Dec.] 20
Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1638, 1639 (Aug. 2, 1993) [hereinafter DOL Urges
Overturn of Mertens] (supporting Mertens by stating that "[i]f nonfiduciaries were exposed
to unlimited liability, such potential exposure would lead to increased costs, which would
ultimately be passed on to plan participants in the form of reduced benefits").
254. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988); Russell, 473 U.S. at 157; see supra notes 9, 78 and
accompanying text (discussing ERISA's purpose).
255. See Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2076 (White, J., dissenting); see supra notes 62-66 and
accompanying text (discussing traditional trust law causes of action against third parties).
256. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (stating that ERISA will "supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan"); see also
supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the disagreement among federal circuits
as to whether ERISA preempts state malpractice claims).
257. Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2078 (White, J., dissenting); see supra notes 210-11 and ac-
companying text (explaining that a money damages remedy would provide participants
and beneficiaries with the same protection under ERISA as they enjoyed under the com-
mon law of trusts).
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federal law.258 Prior to ERISA's enactment, the states' common law of
trusts governed causes of action for fiduciary breaches.259 ERISA's
broad preemption provision, however, displaces all state laws relating to
employee benefit plans,26 including relevant contract and tort actions.26'
Because this preemption precludes other avenues to establish nonfiduci-
ary liability for money damages, there is a greater need for a correspond-
ing ERISA common law remedy. Thus, a denial of this remedy reduces
the available protection and piece of mind for participants and benefi-
ciaries.262 A cause of action against an ERISA nonfiduciary, therefore, is
more appropriate under ERISA and its federal common law than under
state law. If the Mertens Court had applied the four-prong Cort v. Ash
analysis, the results would have indicated overwhelmingly that a private
remedy of money damages against nonfiduciaries who knowingly partici-
pate in fiduciary breaches should be implied under ERISA.
B. Additional Policy Ramifications
In addition to the considerations illustrated in the Cort analysis, other
policy grounds demonstrate that Mertens jeopardizes the security of re-
tirement benefits for participants and beneficiaries. As a direct result of
258. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); see supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text
(providing a discussion of the fourth Cort factor in Russell).
259. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text (discussing traditional trust law prin-
ciples and remedies).
260. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (stating that "any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" are preempted). The Court has
noted the "expansive sweep" of ERISA's preemption provision. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724, 739 (1985). In particular, the phrase "relate to" is given the most expansive meaning
possible so that "a state law 'relate[s] to' a benefit plan ... 'if it has a connection with or
reference to such a plan.'" Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 47 (alteration in original) (quoting Met-
ropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739).
261. See Gibson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
under ERISA, actions at state law are preempted because conduct in connection to the
plan "relates to" the plan).
A state malpractice claim would be ineffective against an ERISA nonfiduciary if the suit
depended upon proof that the nonfiduciary participated in an ERISA fiduciary breach.
See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990) (determining that ERISA
preempted a suit for wrongful termination to avoid a benefit payment). Even if ERISA
does not preempt in this context, state law would determine the nonfiduciary's liability,
while federal law would determine the fiduciary's liability. Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons
Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir. 1992) (emphasizing that the "liability of non-
fiduciaries would be assessed by varying state laws, while the conduct and liability of the
fiduciary whom the third party is claimed to have knowingly assisted in breaching a duty
would be governed by federal law"). This outcome would directly contradict Congress'
intent to ensure that there is uniformity in the administration of employee benefit plans.
See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1987).
262. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 113 S. Ct. 2063, 2078 (1993) (White, J., dissenting).
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the Mertens decision, victims of fiduciary breaches are limited to seeking
relief from fiduciaries. 263 If the fiduciaries are insolvent or if they possess
few valuable assets, they will be unable to provide complete relief to
make the victims whole, leaving participants and beneficiaries to grapple
with an unexpected financial strain.264 Ironically, this result is reminis-
cent of the problems employees encountered prior to the enactment of
ERISA.265 It is inequitable to allow an innocent participant or benefici-
ary, rather than a knowing participant in the breach, to bear the burden
of this unanticipated financial loss. Moreover, ERISA's broad provisions
illustrate Congress' intent to deter statutory violations.266 In the absence
263. See Brock v. Gerace, 635 F. Supp. 563, 569 (D.N.J. 1986) (noting that participants
and beneficiaries would be denied full relief if they were barred from recovering from
nonfiduciaries).
264. For example, Olena Berg, Assistant Labor Secretary for Pensions and Welfare
Benefits stated that in one case, as a result of Mertens, "'benefit losses for claims totalling
over $200,000 will fall on the shoulders of over three hundred people who thought they
were covered by the arrangement.'" DOL Urges Overturn of Mertens, supra note 253, at
1638. Morton Klevan, Director of the Office of Policy and Legislative Analysis in the De-
partment of Labor's Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, stated that
"[f]iduciaries may have few assets, 'but fiduciaries very often, when they breach their du-
ties, they don't do it themselves. They have help.' " Labor Department to Back Bill on
Lawsuits Against Non-Fiduciaries, [July-Dec.] 20 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at
1526, 1526 (July 19, 1993) [hereinafter Labor Department to Back Bill].
265. Congress enacted ERISA because participants and beneficiaries were not receiv-
ing the benefits they expected. See 119 CONG. REC. 147 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1973) ("All too
often working men and women contribute to these pension plans only to find when they
retire that the benefits they had been promised are denied them.") (statement of Sen.
Ribicoff); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 720
(1984) (emphasizing that Congress enacted ERISA "to ensure that employees and their
beneficiaries would not be deprived of anticipated retirement benefits"), superseded by
statute as stated in Long Island Oil Prods. Co. v. Local 553 Pension Fund, 775 F.2d 24 (2d
Cir. 1985); Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980) (stat-
ing that Congress intended that "if a worker has been promised a defined pension benefit
upon retirement-and if he has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to obtain a
vested benefit-he actually will receive it"); Pompano v. Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc.,
680 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir.) (explaining that ERISA's purpose is to ensure that "each par-
ticipant know[s] exactly where he stands with respect to the plan"), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1039 (1982); United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting
Indus. Local 198 AFL-CIO Pension Plan v. Myers, 488 F. Supp. 704, 709 (M.D. La. 1980)
(stating that ERISA is "designed to ensure that legitimate expectations of workers in re-
ceiving retirement benefits actually materialize"), aff'd, 645 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1981).
266. See S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N., 4639,
4871 (explaining that Congress intended ERISA "to provide both the Secretary and par-
ticipants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing violations of
[ERISA]"); see also Nachman Corp., 446 U.S. at 360 (describing ERISA as a "comprehen-
sive and reticulated statute"); Brock, 635 F. Supp. at 566 (emphasizing that "[ilike other
remedial legislation, ERISA should be given a liberal construction in order to carry out its
purposes of protecting the employees' interests and preserving the integrity of plan as-
sets"); Marshall v. Snyder, 430 F. Supp. 1224, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (categorizing ERISA
as a "comprehensive remedial statute"), aff'd in part, 572 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir. 1978).
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of a risk of liability, nonfiduciaries will have a greater incentive to know-
ingly participate in fiduciary breaches to reap personal gain, or at the very
least, they will not be as attentive to the existence of abuse and miscon-
duct as it relates to these retirement plans.267
The Mertens decision also has had a substantial impact on the other
two branches of government. The Department of Labor (Department) is
deeply concerned that Mertens has hampered its efforts to seek full relief
that would make ERISA benefit plans whole following a breach of fiduci-
ary duty.268 For example, in Reich v. Rowe,269 the Department sought
equitable relief in the form of an injunction against a nonfiduciary ac-
countant, who advised a plan trustee as to how to evade state regulators,
to prevent the nonfiduciary from performing such services in the fu-
ture.2 7° The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit broadly
267. See Deborah A. Geier, Note, ERISA: Punitive Damages for Breach of Fiduciary
Duty, 35 CASE. W. RES. L. REv. 743, 755 (1985) (explaining that "'deterrence is most
acute in the situation where the defendant tacitly determines that he will engage in wrong-
ful conduct with the expectation of greater profits and run the risk of later paying compen-
sation for the conduct'" (quoting Lisa M. Broman, Comment, Punitive Damages: An
Appeal for Deterrence, 61 NEB. L. REv. 651, 653 (1982))); see also DeRance, Inc. v.
PaineWebber Inc., 872 F.2d 1312, 1328 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that "[t]he most effective
deterrent to an advisor's breach of his duty out of self-interest or potential profit is to make
the costs of such activity prohibitive").
268. 139 CONG. REC. S9874 (daily ed. July 29, 1993) ("As a result of the Mertens case,
the Department of Labor believes that approximately half of its enforcement efforts may
be impaired.") (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum). This is especially true with respect to
cases arising from the demise of the Executive Life Insurance Company. Id. In this situa-
tion, employer-fiduciaries terminated their company pension plans and replaced them with
Executive Life insurance annuities to pay out the workers' pension benefits. 139 CONG.
REc. S8530 (daily ed. July 1, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). The fiduciaries pro-
ceeded with the knowledge that junk bonds funded over 60% of Executive Life. Id. In
1991, Executive Life went bankrupt, and "[a]s a result, the beneficiaries have lost some of
their pension benefits and they live month to month not knowing if they will be able to
collect the full value of the pensions they were promised." Id.
Morton Klevan, a Department of Labor official, stated that Mertens was problematic
because
by saying that participants under [ERISA Section] 502(a)(3) and by analogy De-
partment of Labor under [Section] 502(a)(5) could only sue under the language of
appropriate and equitable relief, could only get restitution of profits of ill-gotten
gains that the person being sued got but could not get make-whole relief, other-
wise known as consequential damages, you would be faced with situations where
the participants could not be made whole for losses.
Labor Department to Back Bill, supra note 264, at 1526 (alteration in original). Sherwin
Kaplan, another Department of Labor official, stated that because Mertens suggested that
ERISA be construed narrowly, the Department's ERISA litigation has become "very, very
difficult." Labor Department Hampered By Mertens Ruling, Official Says, [Jan.-June] 21
Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 103, 103 (Jan. 10, 1994).
269. 20 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1994). The Secretary of Labor originally sought money dam-
ages, but following Mertens, the Secretary dropped this claim. Id. at 29.
270. Id.
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applied the Mertens rationale and prevented a claim for equitable relief
against the nonfiduciary accountant under section 502(a)(5). 271 Although
the Mertens opinion was primarily dicta, the trend toward strict statutory
interpretation continues. In Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank,27 2 the
Supreme Court addressed whether a private cause of action existed for
aiding and abetting under section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934.273
As in Mertens, the Court focused on the express statutory language and
stated that section 10(b) did not establish aiding and abetting liability di-
rectly or indirectly.274
The Department has urged Congress to implement a legislative solu-
tion that will overturn the Mertens decision that has harshly narrowed the
available remedies.275 The Department supported Senator Howard Met-
zenbaum's proposed amendment, attached to the Omnibus Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1993,276 seeking to overturn Mertens.277 Senator
Metzenbaum, however, dropped the amendment from this bill, choosing
instead to reintroduce the bill as a separate piece of legislation278 and to
hold hearings on the bill.27 9 As Congress addresses the dilemma created
271. Id. at 31. The First Circuit concluded "that Congress did not intend for its grant of
equitable relief in section 1132(a)(5) to authorize the present action against [a nonfiduci-
ary]." Id.
272. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
273. Id. at 1443.
274. Id. at 1455. The Court stated that "[blecause the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit
aiding and abetting, we hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abet-
ting suit under § 10(b)." Id. (emphasis added).
275. In a letter to Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), Secretary of Labor Robert
Reich stated that Mertens " 'takes the trend [of narrowed remedies for plan participants
and beneficiaries] a giant step further, and creates a need for immediate corrective legisla-
tion.'" Non-Fiduciary Liability Amendment Dropped from Budget Reconciliation Bill,
[Jan.-June] 20 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1363, 1363 (June 28, 1993) [hereinafter
Non-Fiduciary Liability Amendment Dropped]; see 139 CONG. REC. S8530 (daily ed. July 1,
1993) ("[B]ecause of a June 1 decision of the Supreme Court in Mertens versus Hewitt, the
Labor and Human Resources Committee, at the request of the Department of Labor,
voted.., to address the problems created by the Mertens decision as quickly and as cleanly
as possible.") (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
276. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 132 (1993).
277. The amendment included a provision assessing pension and health plan service
professionals a minimum penalty of $1,000 for breaches of fiduciary duty, a provision im-
posing a five percent civil penalty on recovery made by private parties, and a provision
creating a retroactive cause of action for any pending case or case brought under the stat-
ute of limitations. Non-Fiduciary Liability Amendment Dropped, supra note 274, at 1363.
278. S. 1312, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). On May 12, 1994, Senator Metzenbaum re-
vealed the details of his pension reform legislation, a "Pension Bill of Rights," which in-
cludes, inter alia, greater protection from fraud and abuse than ERISA currently provides.
Metzenbaum Proposes Restructuring of Pension System in Bill of Rights, [Jan.-June] 21
Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 952, 952 (May 16, 1994).
279. Non-Fiduciary Liability Amendment Dropped, supra note 275, at 1363.
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by Mertens, it may use this issue to stimulate additional pension
reform.2 s0
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted ERISA to protect the pension benefits of a growing
number of retirees from those who misappropriate pension assets for per-
sonal gain. Fiduciaries and nonfiduciaries of pension benefit plans who
knowingly participate in fiduciary breaches are among the exploiters. If
participants and beneficiaries are to receive complete relief from such
breaches, a private cause of action against nonfiduciaries for damages
must be available. Unfortunately, in Mertens, the Court's narrow statu-
tory construction effectively precludes nonfiduciary liability for money
damages. The Court's restricted focus has obscured its broader perspec-
tive of ERISA's fundamental purpose. As a result, the present form of
ERISA provides participants and beneficiaries who depend upon their
employee benefit plans for their financial security with less safeguards
than they would have had under trust law prior to ERISA's enactment.
Because the Court refuses to find a private cause of action against
nonfiduciaries, Congress must remedy this illogical and inequitable deci-
sion with a statutory measure that expressly provides a private cause of
action against nonfiduciaries under ERISA.
Maria Linda Cattafesta
280. Id. at 1363-64. Senator Metzenbaum plans to introduce comprehensive ERISA
reform in 1994. Sen. Metzenbaum to Introduce 'Massive Reform' Legislative Package,
[Jan.-June] 21 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 279, 279 (Jan. 31, 1994).
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